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I. INTIRODUCTION
"Copyright law is essentially a system of property. Like property in
land, you can sell it, leave it to your heirs, donate it, or lease it under any
sort of conditions; you can divide it into separate parts; you can protect it
from almost every kind of trespass."'  But, can a copyright, like real
property, be adversely possessed so that an infringer may acquire title to the
original owner's work? This Article will thoroughly address that question.
The doctrine of adverse possession was traditionally a rule of forfeiture
applied predominantly to realty;2 over time, it has been extended to govern
the transfer of title to personal property Further extension of this real
property doctrine to intangible property is a novel issue which generally has
been avoided by the courts.4 However, a progressive federal district court,
in Gee v. CBS, Inc.,5 confronted and decided this "intriguing question 6
in favor of expanding the adverse possession doctrine to copyright law."
Part II of this Article will trace the development of adverse possession
1. WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (2d ed. 1984).
2. See PATrY GERSTENBLITH, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L.
REV. 119, 120-21 (1988-89).
3. See infra note 13.
4. See Sachs v. Cluett Peabody & Co., 39 N.Y.S.2d 853, 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943)
(Callahan, J., concurring) (A patent for machinery used in the shrinking of fabrics was addressed
by the majority in contract terms, namely the breach of a confidential relationship, instead of
confronting the adverse possession issue), af'd, 53 N.E.2d 241 (N.Y. 1944); see also Sporan v.
MCA Records, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (N.Y. 1983) ("[There is no reason to consider, at
this time, the applicability of the doctrine of adverse possession to intangible property" in an
action for unfair competition regarding the song "Get a Job."), aff'g 451 N.Y.S.2d 750,752 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982) ("I think it premature at this point to determine whether the doctrine of adverse
possession... should be extended to intangible personal property rights.").
5. 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 612 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1979).
6. Id. at 654.
7. Id.
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from realty to personalty, and will analyze the soundness of extending the
doctrine to the latter area.8 Part 1H will then scrutinize the reasoning
which the Gee court set forth in expanding the doctrine to copyright' The
feasibility of sustaining such a cause of action will be addressed in part IV,
and problems that arise from the practical application of this doctrine will
be pinpointed and discussed.'0
Assuming that the doctrine is logically correct and can be effectively
enforced, part V will argue that this state property law must be entirely
preempted by federal copyright law." Finally, part VI will confront the
conflicting policies of adverse possession and copyright law, pitting state
police power concepts against the authority of the United States Constitu-
tion.'
2
II. THE ADVERSE POSSESSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
The adverse possession of personal property is a questionable legal
principle. However, this dubious extension of real property doctrine to the
acquisition of title to chattels exists in theory and in application. 3 Based
on the premise that the validity of a cause of action for adverse possession
of personal property is itself nebulous, it is herein contended that a further
extension of the doctrine to intangible or intellectual property seems
pragmatically impossible. 4
The adverse possession of chattels is derived from an analogy to the
doctrine pertaining to land. 5 Hence, the same elements of this cause of
action apply to both real and personal property.1 6 Further, the requisite
period for which one may claim adverse possession of personalty is
governed by the same time frame set forth in the statutes governing
realty.
7
8. See infra notes 13-38 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 39-82 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 83-128 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 129-200 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 201-49 and accompanying text.
13. See 2A CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 327 (1972).
14. It is worthy to note a relevant statement by the appellant in Sporn: "lit is an interstellar
leap from adverse possession of tangible personalty (which in itself is a radical expansion of this
severe real property doctrine) to intangible rights .... Appellant's Reply Brief at 15, Spom
v. MCA Records, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1324 (N.Y. 1983) (No. 12536176).
15. See supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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"mhe courts generally agree that possession, to be adverse so as to
vest title in the possessor after the lapse of the statutory period, must be
actual, open and notorious, exclusive, hostile, under a claim of right, and
continuous and uninterrupted."'1 First, the various problems encountered
by employing the "open and notorious" element in the personal property
context will be explored. Second, the potential harshness of the doctrine
of adverse possession in general will be discussed.
A. The Difficulties Surrounding Notice
In the realm of personalty, the element of "open and notorious"
possession entails fundamental complications. This requirement hinges
primarily upon the provision of notice to the original owner of the
adversely possessed property. 9 Where land is concerned, it is assumed
that a diligent owner is aware of its location and stable presence upon the
immovable earth."° Therefore, the open and obvious use of land by an
adverse possessor is deemed sufficient to put the original owner on notice
of either a claim to her title or an unlawful trespass.
A notice problem arises where personalty is involved. Chattels, by
their very nature, are movable and capable of concealment. Thus, the
original owner of personalty would not automatically know where to look
to reclaim it, and there would be no immediate and presumed notice of
adverse possession as in the case of realty.
2'
As a result of notice complications, some courts have held that the
statute of limitations necessary to establish the "continuous" possession
element is tolled while the chattel is fraudulently concealed. '  Other
courts have entirely dispensed with the "open and notorious" requirement
18. 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 25 (1972).
19. See infra notes 96-115 and accompanying text.
20. See GERSTENLrrH, supra note 2. "When the subject is real property, it may be possible
to assume that the reasonably diligent owner knows where his or her property is and will be
apprised reasonably quickly of the existence of an adverse claimant who is occupying and using
the land." Id. at 124. The thesis of the comment written by Professor Gerstenblith was not to
disparage the mere existence of the adverse possession of personal property doctrine. Instead, that
scholarly publication suggested "the most important element required [for such a cause of action]
... is the good faith and reasonable reliance of the adverse possessor." See id. at 119.
21. Id. at 124. "When personal property is at issue.... the underlying paradox [is posed]
that even a diligent owner may never receive notice of the adverse claim of one using his or her
property as would the true owner." Id.
22. See 3 THOMAs E. ATKINSON ET AL., AMERICAN LAW Op ftoPERiy § 15.16, at 835-36
(A. James Casner ed., 1952).
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where the adverse possession of personal property is involved. 3 In
essence, these modifications to the traditional doctrine of adverse possession
reveal that its application to personal property is flawed.
The distinction between a pure statute of limitations and adverse
possession may be academic. Where an owner of personal property brings
an action for replevin,' if she is barred by the statute of limitations for
that action, I the property cannot be recovered, possessed or utilized by
her. In effect, all her legal rights to the object cease to exist'2 Therefore,
the property becomes abandoned, and the person in possession acquires title
to the property.
The only distinction between the consequences of a statutory bar to a
replevin action and the doctrine of adverse possession is that the adverse
possessor must prove certain additional elements in order to vest title.
However, as previously discussed, where personal property is involved,
notice is difficult to establish,2 due in large part to the absence of a title-
recording requirement that does exist in the real property context.' As
a result, the failure to prove notice-analogous to the running of the statute
of limitations for a replevin action-leaves the chattel without an owner.29
23. See 2A CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 328 (1972).
24. Replevin is "[a]n action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods
or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken
or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels." BLACK'S LAW DicrIoNARY 1168 (5th ed.
1979).
25. The majority view amongst the states is to place the statutory period barring an action for
replevin at six years. See WIIjAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 793 (2d
ed. 1927).
26. See ATKINSON, supra note 22, at 835 ("Mhe conclusion is necessarily true as a matter
of legal history and principle that the operation of the statute, and that alone, acts to divest the
true owner's title by barring his action to recover the property or its value...
27. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
28. Several states have enacted statutes requiring that deeds for the sale of realty be officially
recorded, with notice of title transfer constituting a major consideration in most jurisdictions. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1146 (5th ed. 1979).
29. When both of these events occur simultaneously, one might suggest that the property be
labeled as abandoned, thus making title available to the first person or entity that takes possession
through the concept of "acquisition by find." See generally JESSE DUKEMINM & JAM KRIER,
PROPERTY §§ 64-86 (2d ed. 1988). It would certainly be a valid argument that the chattel is not
without an owner in this situation because the elements of abandonment must first be established
to divest the original owner of title. However, although it may be technically correct that the
owner lost a cause of action for replevin rather than title to the chattel, if she cannot re-gain the
property from the possessbr, then title would be meaningless.
Another alternative is to vest title in the state. However, this result would probably be
unwise as an unconstitutionally onerous restriction on the ownership of private property. A more
feasible approach, much favored by this author, would be to examine the equities involved in each
19921
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The New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with the aforementioned
dilemma in the landmark case of O'Keeffe v. Snyder.3' The plaintiff,
world-renowned artist Georgia O'Keeffe, found three of her paintings that
were stolen from an art gallery thirty years earlier in defendant Barry
Snyder's gallery.
31
[Instead of deciding the case by applying adverse possession doc-
trine to personal property, the court opted for reliance solely upon
the statute of limitations for an action in replevin.] We are
persuaded that the introduction of equitable considerations
through the discovery rule provides a more satisfactory response
than the doctrine of adverse possession. The discovery rule shifts
the emphasis from the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of
the owner. The focus of the inquiry will no longer be whether
the possessor has met the tests of adverse possession, but whether
the owner has acted with due diligence in pursuing his or her
personal property.
32
Hence, the court rejected extension of adverse possession to chattels
because it deemed the discovery rule more efficient in dealing with the
notice difficulties that arise in locating personal property.33 Such difficul-
ties were apparent in the case of Georgia O'Keeffe's oil paintings, which
presumably would be easier to locate due to her worldwide popularity. The
pragmatic approach of the O'Keeffe court illustrates the narrow distinction
between a statute of limitations in a replevin action and the adverse
possession of personal property.t
B. Strict Construction of the Adverse Possession Doctrine
In addition to notice complications, the extension of adverse possession
to personal property belies the harsh and stringent treatment that courts
case and to vest title accordingly.
30. 416 A.2d 862 (NJ. 1980), rev'g 405 A.2d 840 (NJ. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
31. See O'Keeffe, 405 A.2d at 841.
32. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
33. See also GERSTENBLrH, supra note 2, at 142 ("[TIhe difficulty of establishing exactly
what constitutes open and notorious possession of personal property" was a basis for the O'Keeffe
court's reasoning.) Id.
34. See also WALSH, supra note 25, at 793-94 (Barring an action in replevin through
expiration of the statute of limitations was considered, by this property scholar, to be the
functional equivalent of the vesting of title through the adverse possession of chattels; "[t]he
former owner ceases to have any title, since he has no action [in replevin] by which his right to
the property may be vindicated."). See also ATinsoN, supra note 22, § 15.16 at 834-838.
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have consistently accorded the doctrine when applying it to realty. "The
doctrine of adverse possession is to be taken strictly; that is, it must be
construed strictly in favor of the owner of the title to the land.... It is a
recognized, but not a favored, method of procuring title."35 It is a defiant
notion indeed to ignore this strict interpretation and extend the doctrine of
adverse possession to chattels, but it is beyond logic and the rational realm
of our property law to utilize a rule formulated particularly for the nature,
situation and importance of land, for the acquisition of title to intangible
property rights such as copyright.
Extension of the adverse possession doctrine to personal property
appears tenuous at best. Stretching real property concepts to intangible
property is unworkable and problematic. 36 The preliminary point to be
recognized at this time, is that since a personal and movable object evades
practical application of the doctrine, abstract intangible rights attaching to
expression in an ephemeral media,37 would be completely incapable of
such implementation. A complete and thorough assessment of the elements
of adverse possession as applied to copyright is forthcoming in the
subsequent discussion of the Gee decision.3 8 This analysis is reserved
because Gee is a living example of the purported adverse possession of
copyright doctrine.
III. THE VALmrrY OF GEE V. CBS
The only reported case which has adapted the doctrine of adverse
possession to copyright is Gee v. CBS.39  The adverse possession ruling
35. 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 5 (citations omitted) (1972).
36. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
37. Judge Yates, in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2361-62 (1769), colorfully described the
abstract nature of an author's intangible property rights in her work:
But the property here claimed is all ideal; a set of ideas which have no bounds or
marks whatever, nothing that is capable of a visible possession, nothing that can
sustain any one of the qualities or incidents of property. Their whole existence is in
the mind alone; incapable of any other modes of acquisition or enjoyment, than by
mental possession or apprehension; safe and invulnerable, from their own immaterial-
ity: no trespass can reach them: no tort affect them; no fraud or violence diminish
or damage them. Yet these are the phantoms which the author would grasp and
confine to himself.
A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL QUOTATIONs 24 (Simon James & Chantal Stebbings eds., 1987).
38. See infra notes 39-82 and accompanying text.
39. 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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in Gee was merely one of many issues addressed by the court.' The suit
centered around potential property rights in the estate of the blues singer
and composer, Bessie Smith, often described as the "Empress of the
Blues."4'
Ms. Smith died in a tragic automobile accident in 1937.42 Her
surviving husband, Jack Gee, Sr., died in 1975.' 3 The action was filed by
Jack Gee, Jr., the purportedly adopted son of Smith and Jack Gee, Sr."
The original complaint sounded in copyright and alleged infringement by
Columbia Phonograph Company ("Columbia") and its successors.' The
focus of the opinion written by District Court Judge Edward R. Becker
concerned a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Columbia.' One of the
grounds urged for dismissal was that Columbia adversely possessed
plaintiff's intangible property rights to certain recordings. 7
The adverse possession issue involved title to the song "At the
Christmas Ball."' Shortly after this recording was made by Bessie Smith
on November 18, 1925, it was rejected by Columbia.49 Subsequent to
Bessie Smith's death, Columbia issued the recording of "At the Christmas
Ball" in 1951.Y° This track appeared on Volume 3 of an album entitled
the "Bessie Smith Story-Golden Era Series."' The same "record was
re-recorded and re-issued in 1972 as part of. .. 'Nobody's Blues But
viine.'
' 2
The first criticism which must be levied against the Gee court for
extending adverse possession to copyright, aside from the logical impracti-
cability of doing so, is the mode of reasoning employed to achieve the
40. The claims raised by plaintiff, giving rise to various collateral issues, were, inter alia: (1)
a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 civil rights claim, see Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 613-40; (2) contract invalidity,
see id. at 640-42; (3) copyright infringement, see id. at 642-45; (4) unfair competition, see id. at
645-61; (5) common law copyright, see id.; (6) misappropriation of property interest in Bessie
Smith's name, see i& at 661-62.
41. Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 609 (ED. Pa. 1979).
42. Id. at 610.
43. Id.
44. Id. The executor of Jack Gee. Sr.'s estate, William D. Harris, was later joined as plaintiff.
See id.
45. Id
46. Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 610.
47. Id. at 653-54.
48. Id. at 652-53.
49. Id at 651. It should also be noted that no financial records were prepared or retained by
Columbia regarding any payments made to Bessie Smith for this recording. Id.
50. Id
51. Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 651.
52. Id. at 651-52.
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result. This court failed to adequately recognize or address the distinguish-
ing factors prevalent in the case law and other authorities cited in support
of applying the adverse possession doctrine to copyrights.
After recognizing that the adverse possession of intangible property
rights was an "intriguing question,"53 Judge Becker employed only a brief
analysis relying primarily upon two cases, namely, Lightfoot v. Davis'
and Priester v. Millenan.55 Crucial to Gee's analogy of the case before
it to Lighffoot and Priester, was the definition of a "chose in action." The
court, relying on a personal property treatise, described a "chose in action"
as follows:
[Miany rights do not... concern specific tangible things but
consist of claims against third persons which, since they may be
enforced by action... are of value and thus entitled to be termed
property in the broader sense. Bank accounts, debts generally,
corporate stock, patents and copyrights are common instances of
this class of [intangible] property... While "choses in action"
are usually "represented by a piece of paper" (i.e. savings pass-
book federal copyright certificate), the essence of a "chose in
action" is a "right of property which.., is essentially intangible
in that it can ultimately only be claimed or enforced by action,
not by taking physical possession."
56
Then, the court reasoned that since New York has explicitly applied the
doctiine of adverse possession to "choses in action" under Lightfoot, the
same approach should be adopted here without questioning the basis for the
Lightfoot decision."
Even though the Lightfoot court applied the adverse possession
doctrine to a "chose in action," one must remember that this decision
involved bonds, not copyright certificates. 5 In Lightfoot, the defendant's
53. Id. at 654.
54. 91 N.E. 582 (N.Y. 1910).
55. 55 A.2d 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1947).
56. Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 654 (quoting RAY BROWN, BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7,
at 11, 13 (1955)).
57. Id. at 654-55.
58. See Sporn, 448 N.E.2d 1324, in which the plaintiff's appellate brief vigorously and aptly
distinguished the Lightfoot holding from the instant case and the Gee decision as follows:
Lighifoot has little relevance either to our facts or to the Gee facts, and for several
reasons. First of all, the property sought to be adversely possessed in Lightfoot was
a"bearer" bond. Therefore, when the Lightfoot court stated that one may appropriate
anything "tangible",[sic] [Lightfoot v. Davis, 91 N.E. 582, 583 (N.Y. 1910) (quoting
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885)], it was referring to a bearer bond which is
capable of tangible, exclusive possession. He who possesses a bearer bond may
1992]
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testator converted bearer bonds from the plaintiff's bureau drawer, and
collected the principal and interest once the instruments matured.59 The
Lightfoot court ultimately rendered judgment on behalf of plaintiff.' °
However, this result emerged only after equitable principles such as
constructive trust theory were haphazardly propounded.6' Although the
New York Court of Appeals accepted the concept of adverse possession of
personal property,62 it is unclear from the language of the Ligh~foot
opinion whether the doctrine can apply to "choses in action" generally.
The essence of the analogy supporting extension of the doctrine from
real to personal property, according to Lighoot, is the possession of a
tangible thing.' The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that since
acquisition of title by possession is well grounded and recognized in the
law, and because other jurisdictions have extended the doctrine to
personalty, the same should be done in this instance." Relying on the
authority of United States Supreme Court Justice Samuel F. Miller, the
following phraseology was dispositive:
Possession has always been a means of acquiring title to property.
It was the earliest mode recognized by mankind of the appropria-
tion of anything tangible by one person to his own use, to the
exclusion of others, and legislators and publicists have always
acknowledged its efficacy in confirming or creating title.'
Notice that "the appropriation of anything tangible"' was the focus of
Judge Miller's analysis. This emphasis is inconsistent with Gee's
understanding of LighOfoot (the case that extended the doctrine of adverse
legitimately cash it, and only it, one may not cash a photocopy or other reproduction,
as there is and may be only one original such bearer bond. However, in our
situation, not only are the rights in a master sound recording intangible, but he who
possesses one copy of a recorded performance, unlike a bearer bond, is quite capable
of precise "pressing" or reproduction to the point where the original master is
indistinguishable from millions of its copies-each such "copy" is in fact an
"original". [sic]Consequently, Lightfoot stands only for the proposition that a
tangible document may be appropriated to the exclusion of others.
Appellant's Brief at 44, Sporn, 448 N.E.2d 1324 (No. 12536/76) (alteration in original).
59. See Ligh~oot, 91 N.E. at 582.
60. Id. at 586.
61. Id. at 585-86.
62. Id. at 584.
63. Id. at 583-84.
64. See Lightfoot, 91 N.E. at 583.
65. Id. (citing Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885)).
66. Id.
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possession to "choses in action").Y
According to the Gee court, "choses in action" are "essentially intangi-
ble.""8 The court's failure to confront or explain the fundamental precept
underlying the Lightfoot decision, namely the tangible nature of the bonds,
thereby weakens the foundation of its conclusion. The Gee court should
have at least mentioned the problem and reconciled it within the rules of
stare decisis. Thus, this unquestioned and firm reliance upon Lightfoot
infiltrates and flaws the Gee holding in all respects.
Moreover, the reference in the Gee decision to Priester69 is without
logical merit. Similar to the reliance on Lightfoot, a synopsis of Gee's
analysis is that there is nothing in Priester, or other case law, requiring
limitation of the doctrine to tangible chattels;70 therefore, adverse posses-
sion should be extended automatically to intangible property. This type of
reasoning is circular in nature. If such a concept is accorded credence,
courts would acquire unfettered authority to stretch any rule if there is no
express restriction on that authority. However, the Gee court nevertheless
disregarded the strict construction which has traditionally accompanied the
doctrine of adverse possession.
In general, the Gee court's treatment of copyright law is inundated
with unexplained and infirm premises. In support of the conclusion that no
distinction or reason exists for limiting adverse possession to personal
property, the court quoted from a 1937 Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision7' entitled Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station:72 "At com-
mon law, rights in a literary or artistic work were recognized on substan-
tially the same basis as title to other property.713 What the Gee court did
not explicitly point out, however, is that Waring involved a state common
law copyright claim,'4 unlike the instant case, where Bessie Smith's
recordings were federally registered copyrights. 5 Therefore, Waring is
cited entirely out of context.
The legal discussion in Gee is infirm for a number of reasons. First,
it is not clear whether the court was applying the doctrine of adverse
possession to common law copyright. The opinion's failure to cite any
67. See Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 654-55.
68. Id. at 654.
69. See Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 653-54.
70. See id. at 654.
71. Id. at 655.
72. 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
73. Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 655 (quoting Waring, 194 A. at 634).
74. See Waring, 194 A. at 633-34.
75. See Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 610.
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federal copyright statutes or case law is evidence of such an application,
and remotely explains its reliance upon Waring. If the state theory of
common law copyright infringement was the focus in Gee, this constitutes
a significant error. Federal copyright law would preempt any state
claims76 since the songs involved were copyrights registered under federal
law.n
Second, for some unfathomable reason, the Gee court assumed that
Bessie Smith's style and manner of performance in recording "At the
Christmas Ball" was the ownership right asserted.78 This assumption is
irrelevant and unwarranted because the copyright to the sound recording
itself is the only interest protected by federal copyright law. 9
The fundamental defects in the Gee court's analysis cripple its
resulting extension of the adverse possession doctrine to copyright law.
The court considered neither the feasibility of maintaining such a cause of
action, 0 the possibility of preemption by federal copyright law," nor the
underlying countervailing policies of adverse possession and federal
copyright law.' These are the fatal omissions which will be discussed in
the remaining portions of this Article.
76. See infra notes 129-200 and accompanying text.
77. See Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 610.
78. See id. at 656.
79. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), established the principle that "[a]
voice is not copyrightable" under federal law. Id. at 462.
In Midler, Young & Rubicam, Inc., the advertising agency employed by the defendant Ford
Motor Company, specifically retained Ula Hedwig to imitate plaintiff Bette Midler's singing style
in a Ford commercial after Midler's manager, Jerry Edelstein, denied Young & Rubicam's request
for Ms. Midler's performance in the project. Id. at 461. Although the Midler composition "Do
You Want To Dance" was licensed to Young & Rubicam, "[n]either the name nor picture of
Midler was used in the commercial .... " The plaintiff sued claiming that the voice itself was
protected. Il at 461-62.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that even though "federal copyright law preempts much of the
area," there can be recovery under the California common law tort for invasion of one's
"proprietary interest!' in her "identity." Id. at 462-63 (citing Motschenbacher v. RJ. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)). However, the holding of the Midler case was
limited to deliberate imitation of a professional singer's widely known and "distinctive voice."
Id. Thus, state common law theories might be available for adverse possession purposes.
However, assuming there is no preemption, the remaining arguments of this comment in
opposition to the adverse possession of copyright would be equally applicable to such state
theories.
80. See infra notes 83-128 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 129-200 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 201-49 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE FEASIBILITY OF MAINTAINING A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR THE ADVERSE PosSESSION OF COPYRIGHT
The traditional elements of adverse possession cannot successfully be
applied to the acquisition of a copyright because it is intangible property.
First, a copyright is incapable of physical possession and the elements of
"open and notorious" and "actual possession" cannot be satisfied.3  As a
result, the maintenance of such a cause of action would necessarily entail
"use," not "possession" of the copyrighted work. Second, due to the nature
of the original copyright owner's rights, the adverse possessor's use or
possession can never be "exclusive."
The elements of "continuity" and "hostility" do not present inherent
doctrinal flaws, and could, with some alteration, successfully be utilized in
copyright situations. However, despite this accommodation, the adverse
possession of copyright doctrine cannot be maintained by fulfillment of
these two elements alone. A failure to prove any one element is, by itself,
fatal to sustaining a cause of action for adverse possession."
A. Physical Possession
At the outset, "[t]wo types of property rights must be distinguished:
(1) ownership of copyright; and (2) ownership of the material object in
which the copyrighted work is embodied."'  "The material object, [for
instance a] 'copy' or 'phonorecord,' ... is tangible and corporeal and has
physical existence,"ss unlike the underlying copyright itself, which is
essentially an intangible right,' incapable of physical possession.
83. The late Professor Melville Nimmer, a leading authority and commentator in the area of
copyright law, criticized the doctrine of adverse possession of copyright and the reasoning in Gee
based entirely upon the problems encountered by the "possession" of intangibles:
Mhe court in Gee ... held [that] ... acts of infringement which occurred within the
limitation period to be barred under a rather startling application of the doctrine of
adverse possession. The Gee court found support for this conclusion in those cases
which have applied the doctrine of adverse possession to personal as well as to real
property. It nevertheless appears most questionable to apply the doctrine to an
intangible such as literary property, which by its nature is incapable of possession.
MELVaILE NIMmER, NiMMER ON COPyRiGH:. A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF LrTERARY, MusicAL
AND ARTismnc PROPERTY, AND THE PROTEcrION OF IDEAS § 12.05, at 12-64.14 n.3 (1990).
84. See, e.g., Belotti v. Bickhardt, 127 N.E. 239, 241 (N.Y. 1920).
85. HARRY HENN, HEM ON COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 93-94 (3d ed.
1991).
86. Id. at 94 n.2.
87. Id.
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The normal avenue for enforcement or exercise of an owner's rights
in physical personal property or material expression of a copyright is
through an action for conversion.88 Such an action lies where there is
"[ain unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over
goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their
condition or to the exclusion of the owner's rights." 9
If one accepts the validity of the doctrine of adverse possession of
chattels, then this cause of action is available where a material object or
expression of one's copyright is involved. Of course, upon successful
satisfaction of all the elements of adverse possession the new owner
acquires title only to the object itself, namely the particular copy of the
88. However, the same individual or entity may have dual rights to a conversion and a
copyright infringement action, based upon tangible and intangible rights, respectively. These
separate, yet overlapping rights, were competently distinguished and described in a 1941 law
review comment:
The author of a work, be it art, music or literature, has a twofold right. He has
tangible property consisting of a canvas with paint, or paper with notes or writing on
it, and he has the incorporeal right to make copies of it. If the book were taken, a
conversion action would be proper as it would be wherever any tangible personal
property was unlawfully taken. But where the intangible right to duplicate or to first
publish is violated conversion does not lie. Specific remedies are provided for in
such cases for infringement of copyright, or injunction to prevent publication.
So in this specialized field a special remedy is provided for the infringement
of the incorporeal right involved. It is a tort action, as is conversion, but it is not the
action of conversion.
Lester Rubin, Comment, Conversion of Choses in Action, 10 FORDHAM L. REVIEw 415, 430-31
(1941) (footnotes omitted).
A general rule of tort law is that no action for conversion lies where intangible property is
involved. See W .iiAM PROSSER & ROBERT KEuTON, PROSSER AND KE)N ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 91 (5th ed. 1984). However, some courts have carved out exceptions to this principle
where presented with novel situations. See id.
"The first relaxation of the rule was with respect to the conversion of a document in which
intangible rights were merged, so that the one became the symbol of the other-as in the case of
a promissory note, a check, a bond, a bill of lading, or a stock certificate." Id. Further extension
of this qualification has led the courts to focus upon the "importance" of the intangible rights to
the tangible object. See id.
At least where the failure of a corporation to record the transfer of stock shares are
involved, the rule has been entirely abandoned to permit a conversion action for purely intangible
rights without any corresponding tangible instrument of ownership. See id. Although limited
abrogation of the general rule against intangible conversion has occurred, this slight alteration is
probably due to judicial avoidance of resulting inequities, and has little doctrinal import.
89. BLACK'S LAW DICriONARY 300 (5th ed. 1979).
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work, and not to the intangible copyright privileges.90 Hence, there are
no problems of physical possession because the material object may be held
by human hands.
When property rights do not arise from any physical object capable of
possession, but rather manifest within a bundle of intangible rights, the
doctrine of adverse possession is inappropriate. Certainly, where the
unauthorized duplication, use and claim of ownership is involved, the
appropriate legal recourse is an action for copyright infringement, not
adverse possession.
An illustration of the preceding observations and conclusions can be
found in O'Neill v. General Film Co.9' In O'Neill, the plaintiff claimed
ownership in "the literary... [and] performing rights [of Charles Fechter's]
dramatization of Alexander Dumas' novel, 'The Count of Monte
Cristo."' 92  The court, in addressing the important distinction between
intangible copyright ownership and property rights in material objects or
chattels, reasoned as follows:
It is quite clear, I think, that title to a chattel may be acquired by
adverse possession and claim of ownership, and on the evidence
title to the manuscript by adverse possession and claim of
ownership was sufficiently shown . . . but present title to the
manuscript, while some evidence of the ownership of the play, if
standing alone, might be insufficient to sustain the action, for the
owner might have parted with possession of the manuscript
without parting with his rights as an author .... 93
Thus, the O'Neill court left the scope of the injunction sought by the
plaintiff, as far as it concerned copyright law, to the federal courts.9'
90. Cf. WALLS, THE COPYRIGr HANDBOOK 7 (1963) (The tangible articles containing the
work may be in the possession of many persons other than the copyright owner, and they may
use the work for their own enjoyment, but copyright restrains them from reproducing the work
without the owner's consent.").
91. 157 N.Y.S. 1028 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916).
92. Id. at 1030 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 1036 (citations omitted). The O'Neill decision, decided well before Gee, also stated
that "[nlo decision is cited, and we have found none, which holds that [a copyright] may be
acquired by adverse possession and claim of ownership." Id. This dicta evinces a reluctance to
consider and rule on the validity of the doctrine of adverse possession of copyright One may
even view this explicit avoidance of the issue, while tacitly pertinent to the plaintiff's ownership
claims in the O'Neill case, to be an early rejection of the doctrine as an utter absurdity unworthy
of further discussion.
94. See id. at 1040. However, the appellant's brief to the New York Court of Appeals in
Spom v. MCA Records, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1324 (N.Y. 1983), vigorously contended that the O'Neill
decision rejected Lightfoot v. Davis, 91 N.E. 582 (N.Y. 1910), "as authority for the proposition
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Assuming that the doctrine of adverse possession could be applied to
copyright, the elements pertaining to possession must be altered. Due to
the intangible nature of copyright, one could never possess its subject
matter; however, it could utilize the copyright by exercising ownership
rights through copying, duplication, licensing and the like. Thus, not only
must possession be understood to contemplate "use," but it would probably
be more appropriate to label the doctrine "adverse use of copyright."9 5
Yet, even after one adopts this necessary alteration of terms, two essential
elements of the traditional real property doctrine are still incongruent with
the notion of copyright: (1) open and notorious, and (2) actual possession.
1. Open and Notorious Possession
In a nutshell, the "open and notorious" requirement is basically one of
"notice."
It is essential to the acquisition of title by adverse possession that
the true owner shall have knowledge or notice, actual or construc-
tive, of possession by another which is hostile or adverse. The
true owner must have actual knowledge of the hostile claim or the
possession must be so open, visible, and notorious as to raise a
presumption of notice to, or knowledge by him of the adverse
claim. 96
At first glance, the supposition that notice is not a problem in an adverse
relied upon in Gee," Appellant's Brief at 45, Sporn (No. 12536176), and that a precedent was
thereby established prohibiting the adverse possession of intangibles. See id. The appellant was
of the opinion that the Sporn court "need only cite O'Neill to hold that title to [copyright] 'cannot
pass' via adverse possession." Id. at 46. The exact quote from O'Neill to which appellant
Murray Spor was referring is the statement that "[nie decision is cited, and we have found none,
which holds that [intangible] rights may be acquired by adverse possession and claim of
ownership." O'Neill, 157 N.Y.S. at 1036.
This author disagrees with the significance attributed to O'Neill as represented by the
appellant in Sporn. The court in O'Neill never passed on the adverse possession question, and
its mention of the absence of any prior precedent on this issue is mere dicta. Since the decision
was deferred to the federal courts, any additional discussion of the substance of copyright law in
O'Neill does not constitute its holding, and is certainly not binding precedent. The arguments
proffered by the defendants-respondents in Sporn are consistent with and support this position and
interpretation of the significance of the Ugh1foot decision. See Respondent's Brief at 24-25,
Sporn (No.1253616) ("The court in O'Neill declined on the facts before it to apply adverse
possession principles to a claim involving property rights in a motion picture script. But it did
not reject the notion that rights of an intangible nature might be acquired by proscription [sic];
it merely had no occasion to resolve the issue one way or the other."). Id.
95. This proposed term could be interpreted as a synonym for copyright infringement.
96. 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 51 (1972).
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possession of a copyright claim appears acceptable. The Gee court
certainly thought so when it held that Columbia Records "openly and
notoriously" possessed Bessie Smith's recording of "At the Christmas
Ball."97
Subsequent to Ms. Smith's death, when the song in issue was
apparently the property of her estate, the following statement by Colum-
bia-appearing on the record jacket of the album containing the recording
of this song-was deemed sufficient notice: "She [Bessie Smith] left
behind her 160 recordings (every one of them, incidentally, the property of
Columbia Records)." 98 Judge Becker could "think of no more 'open' or
'notorious' assertion of ownership than the one Columbia made."
The notice given by Columbia in Gee appears constructive in nature.
However, another form of constructive notice recognized by federal
copyright law is the filing of a copyright registration certificate. Consistent
with Gee, this method of notice would probably be sufficient for adverse
possession of copyright purposes since traditional adverse possession law
regards the filing of a notice of claim as proper notice."°° There might
be a tendency for one to acknowledge and accommodate satisfaction of the
"open and notorious" element through copyright "use" by an adverse
possessor. However, a fundamental dilemma exists very much akin to the
problems posed by the adverse possession of personal property, and cannot
be overlooked when attempting to extend the doctrine to intangibles.
a. Location of the Property
Some courts have been reluctant to extend the doctrine of adverse
possession to personal property because of the difficulties encountered in
proving notice."0' The adverse possession of real property is premised on
the notion that the original owner knows the exact location of his or her
land. 2 Due to the immovable nature of land, the adverse possessor's
occupation of the realty is deemed sufficient to constitute notice satisfying
the "open and notorious" element. 3
Personal property is capable of being transported so that the original
97. Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 656 (emphasis deleted).
98. Id (emphasis deleted).
99. Id.
100. See 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 53 (1972).
101. See, e.g., OKeeffe, 416 A.2d at 870-71.
102. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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owner could encounter difficulty in locating the adversely possessed
property.1° As a result, the probability of proving adverse possession of
chattels is drastically reduced. Also, the opportunity for fraudulent
concealment by the adverse possessor contributes to this doctrinal
defect.
105
If disregarding the notice difficulties accompanying the adverse
possession of chattels theory was not confusing enough, extending the
theory to intangibles such as copyrights complicates the matter even further.
Since the abstract rights associated with copyright ownership are incapable
of being physically possessed, physical location of the property is
indeterminable. Further, notice of adverse use of one's copyright is
difficult to prove because the infringer could be anywhere within the
country.
The extension of the adverse possession doctrine to chattels might be
rationalized somewhat by requiring the diligent owner to make reasonable
efforts to locate the property. These attempts might include factual
inquiries or newspaper advertisements in the geographical location where
the property was last seen, so that information can be gathered regarding
its whereabouts.
Nevertheless, the type of investigation which could be conducted to
find missing chattels is unrealistic where one is attempting to locate the
adverse use of his or her copyright. Because there is no single physical
manifestation of adverse copyright use, unlike realty and personalty, the
original owner would not know where to search. Hence, how could the
law, through adverse possession of copyright, consistent with its underlying
purposes, punish the owner that does not have the slightest chance (in most
circumstances) to exercise diligence and enforce his or her property rights?
b. Copyright Registration
One might posit the notion that an adverse possessor's copyright
registration'06 could function as sufficient notice. However, this sugges-
104. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 22.
106. At the outset, one must realize the distinction between "registration" and "deposit" of
a work. Professor Melville Nimmer clearly explains the difference between these items as
follows:
Deposit and registration under the Copyright Act are "separate though closely
related." The function of deposit is to provide the Library of Congress via the
Copyright Office with copies and phonorecords of all works published within the
United States. The function of registration is to create a written record of the
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tion must fail for a different reason, namely an improper placement of the
burden to discover infringement.
The registration of a copyrighted work is a discretionary process where
copyrightable expression is all that is necessary to qualify." One may
view the extent of the Copyright Register's discretion in issuing a
registration certificate to be so minimal as to be ministerial in nature."°
The absence of a search requirement for earlier copyrighted works supports
this observation.1 9 Yet, the effect of the registration document is crucial
because it constitutes prima facie evidence of copyright ownership."0
Once the original author registers his copyright, he puts the public on
"actual notice... to those who search the Copyright Office records,".
and constructive notice of ownership to all others."' Completion of the
registration process relieves the original owner of her duty to check for
infringement, and it should be incumbent upon the adverse possessor to
search for any other preexisting and substantially similar copyrighted works.
A search of the copyright office records before the good faith adverse
possessor is granted registration will disclose the original copyright registra-
tion. Although the ministerial nature of the registration process"' may
result in an adverse possessor's application form slipping through the
system and becoming registered, eventually, the copyright which was
registered first prevails at trial and all is remedied. In sum, registration
should relieve the original owner of his burden to search the copyright
copyright ownership in a work. Registration necessarily requires an accompanying
deposit. Deposit, on the other hand, may be accomplished without an accompanying
registration.
NuImER, supra note 83, § 7.17[A] at 7-176 (footnotes omitted).
107. "Section 410(a) [of the 1976 Copyright Act] requires registration and the issuance of a
certificate if the Register 'after examination' determines that 'the material deposited constitutes
copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and formal requirements' have been met.
But § 410(b) requires refusal of registration if the Register determines that 'the material deposited
does not constitute copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid for any other reason."'
Id. § 7.21[A] at 7-204. However, the Register cannot refuse registration pursuant to a work's lack
of "originality" because this is a determination for the courts. Id. at 7-205.
108. But see id. at 7-204 n.1.
109. See WILWIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S TH COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (6th ed. 1986).
110. "[IThe copyright registration certificate constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity
of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate." NIMMER, supra note 83, § 7.1611] at
7-171 (emphasis added). The validity and facts stated in the certificate identify the owner if the
author is a plaintiff in a copyright infringement action. Otherwise, ownership by any other entity
(other than a work for hire) must be established through a licensing agreement.
111. rd. § 7.16[H] at 7-175.
112. Id. § 7.16[E] at 7-173.
113. See supra note 108.
1992]
64 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol.13
office records for subsequently filed infringing works. Instead, fulfilling
the notice requirement of adverse possession by an adverse possessor's
wrongful registration places the burden back upon the original owner,
which is inequitable in all respects. This defeats the purposes of the federal
registration system which are to "secur[e] a comprehensive record of
copyright claims,"'"4 and to assure a prima facie grant of copyright when
conclusive ownership must be established in a court of law.15
2. Actual Possession
As previously established, it is impossible to physically possess an
intangible copyright.11 6 However, one could contend that the doctrine of
adverse possession, when applied to copyright, should be altered to allow
for physical possession of instruments of ownership as a substitute for the
element of actual possession.
For instance, consider a good faith licensee who has no idea that she
has been defrauded, and who is currently and unknowingly engaging in
copyright infringement. Possession of this licensing contract would
constitute actual possession for adverse possession purposes. Moreover,
possession of a wrongfully issued registration certificate by the copyright
office would also amount to actual possession according to this argument.
The possession of documents other than a registration certificate as
conclusive evidence of title for intangible property rights, however, is
meager proof for depriving an original owner of his copyright. First,
allowing an invalid legal instrument, which purports to extend legal rights
which it cannot convey, to give rise to title by adverse possession is
entirely inequitable and disregards general notions of justice and fundamen-
tal fairness.
Second, for reasons discussed earlier, possession of a material object
is distinguishable from "adverse use" or the exercise of rights commensu-
rate with copyright ownership. 7 Consistent with this position is the Gee
court's admonition that Columbia Records "took actual possession... in
the only meaningful sense it could: by distributing the record and retaining
for itself all monies received therefrom.".... However, distribution is not
really possession, it is adverse use or copyright infringement. Therefore,
114. See PATRY, supra note 109, at 176.
115. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
118. Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 656.
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all notions of actual possession should be abandoned and "actual use"
adopted as the appropriate substitute if the adverse possession of copyright
doctrine is to survive.
B. Exclusive Possession
The element of exclusivity must be established by proving the absence
of possession by all others:
To be effective as a means of acquiring title, the possession of an
adverse claimant must be exclusive of the true owner. In other
words, a claimant's exclusive possession must be such as to
operate as an ouster or disseisin of the owner of the legal title,
and the owner must be wholly excluded from possession by
claimant." 9
Assuming that "exclusive possession" means "exclusive use" in the
copyright context, a problem is created in that adverse possession could
never exclude the true owner from using the copyright.
The bundle of rights to which a copyright owner is entitled under
federal law are explicitly exclusive in nature.' 2 Implicit in and inter-
twined with the exclusive rights to publish, record, and create derivative
works, is the logical inference that the owner also has a right not to do
so. '21 This is especially true where it is in the best interest of the
copyright holder to prevent the copyrighted work from entering the market
at a particular point in time."2  Hence, copyright use by an adverse
possessor should logically be considered concurrent with, not exclusive of,
the original owner's rights.
C. Continuous and Hostile Possession
The concept of "continuity" refers to the uninterrupted possession of
realty or personalty for the period of the statute of limitations, thus giving
rise to adverse possession." Where copyright is implicated, continuity
cannot be understood in a traditional sense. Although the court in Gee
considered the continuity element to be the only problematic issue
119. 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 55 (1972).
120. See infra note 156.
121. See infra note 213.
122. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
123. See 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 149 (1972).
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concerning the adverse possession of copyright rule,24 this requirement
is not plagued by doctrinal inconsistencies.
The problem, according to the court in Gee, was the definition of the
terms "continuous and uninterrupted.""n After considering a variety of
criteria," the court eventually defined continuous use as "availabili-
ty."'" Regardless of how courts define the term "continuous" for adverse
possession of copyright purposes, the ultimate concern is when to toll the
statute of limitations. This definition of "continuous" can be worked out
(even if on a case-by-case basis) without presenting the quandary that the
other adverse possession elements entail.
Besides the element of continuity, the only other element which could
possibly be fulfilled in an adverse possession of copyright action is that of
"hostility." The term "hostile" is synonymous with adversity in interest to
the true owner."U Hence, any unauthorized use of a work made by a
person or entity other than the original owner is adverse and hostile to the
latter's copyright ownership interest, and does not warrant further
discussion.
V. FEDERAL PREEmpTON
The adverse possession of real and personal property is exclusively a
124. See Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 656.
125. Id.
126. The Gee court, before deciding on any particular approach to the issue of whether
defendant Columbia Records continuously possessed or used Bessie Smith's recording of "At the
Christmas Ball," outlined a number of views. Id. at 656. Judge Becker stated as follows:
Indeed our only real question is whether defendants' actions were "continuous" and
"uninterrupted" during the entire statutory period--4hree years in New York, six in
Pennsylvania. While that concept has a readily ascertainable meaning in the case of
land or tangible personalty like chattels, it is not obvious what constitutes "continu-
ous" and "uninterrupted" use in the case of a singing performance embodied in a
record. One criterion would be how long defendants continued to receive money
from the sale of the record. Another criterion would be how long the record was
listed in the record company's catalogue available for distribution. Another
possibility would be to focus on whether the 1951 four volume album became part
of the permanent collection of libraries, including the Library of Congress. In that
event, the duration of its listing in library catalogues might be dispositive.
Id.
127. Id.
128. See 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 59 (1972).
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF COPYRIGHT
matter of state law enacted pursuant to the states' police power.n9
Pursuant to the Copyright Clause in the United States Constitution,
30
Congress has the authority to enact federal legislation governing the subject
matter of copyright. 131  In sum, the state doctrine of adverse possession
as applied to copyright is preempted by existing federal copyright law.
The constitutional basis for the doctrine of federal preemption is the
Supremacy Clause, which provides: "This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be...
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby ... .,,132 The logical inference and plain meaning of the text of
this clause indicates that, where federal and state law clash, the former
controls if it is'constitutionally valid. 3
It was assumed from the time of adoption of the Copyright Clause, and
subsequently confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Goldstein
v. California,34 that the states and the federal government possess
concurrent powers to enact copyright laws, subject only to preemption by
129. Cf. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 432 (1972) ("The police power pertains to such
rules and regulations relating to personal and property rights as affect the public health, public
safety, and public welfare. It is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society.").
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
131. See NIMMER, supra note 83, § 1.02 at 1-30.
132. U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
133. This interpretation applies with great force if read in conjunction with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution when the Copyright Clause was adopted. There was virtually
unanimous agreement amongst the framers that the copyright power should be subject to federal
control. See NMMER, supra note 83, § 1.01[A] at 1-3. This virtual consensus is evinced by the
brief discussion of the Copyright Clause by James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 43, which
recognized the impotence of the states to ever render effectual legal doctrine. Id.
A single paragraph was all that was deemed necessary by Madison to convince the ratifiers
at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 of the utility of the Copyright Clause:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has
been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right to
useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public
good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have
anticipated the decision of this point by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERAuST No. 43 (James Madison).
The fact that a mere paragraph was written on the subject is persuasive evidence, per se,
of the force and content of the framers' intent. Also, Madison's mention of Great Britain's
common law approach to copyright, when analyzed in conjunction with the intense disdain for
the English monarchy at the time of ratification, leads to a tacit conclusion that federal statutory
law should preempt, in all circumstances, state common law enactments that are similar to English
law.
134. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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federal statute.' The doctrine of federal preemption, derived from the
express language of the Supremacy Clause, was codified by Congress in
1976 in section 301 of the Copyright Act.'36 The scope of state laws
subject to federal preemption is defined by this enactment.
37
Under 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), a state law is subject to federal preemption
if it creates:
[L]egal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103.13
The requirements of this statute and the law of federal preemption can be
divided into four distinct elements: (1) equivalent rights; (2) a tangible
medium of expression; (3) the subject matter of copyright; and (4)
consistency with the requirements of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.
39
A. Equivalent Rights
Courts have utilized two general approaches for ascertaining whether
a state right is equivalent to section 106's exclusive federal rights
recognized pursuant to section 301(a). A state right is equivalent to an
exclusive federal right if:
(1) the right encompasses conduct coming within the scope of one
or more of section 106's exclusive rights, and
(2) if applicable state law requires the plaintiff to prove no more
than the elements that the Copyright Act requires for proof of
infringement of one or more of section 106's five exclusive
135. See ND mER, supra note 83, § 1.01[B] at 1-7.
136. Id. § 1.0lIB] at 1-8.
137. See id.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1977).
139. Professor Melville Nimmer treats federal preemption as a two part test, namely: (1)
"mhe nature of the rights granted under state law"; and (2) "ITihe nature of the work in which
such rights may be claimed." NIMMER, supra note 83, § 1.01[B] at 1-10 to 1-11. Professor Paul
Goldstein classifies the preemption doctrine as a three part test which is essentially co-extensive
with the first three elements recognized in this comment. See PAUL GOLDsEI, COPYRIGHT
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.2, at 473-74 (1989). The author of this comment adds a
fourth element based upon the bare minimum constitutional requirements of the Supremacy
Clause. Of course, reasonable minds can differ.
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rightsY40
Under either of these judicial constructions of section 301(a), the state
doctrine of adverse possession of copyright is equivalent to the exclusive
rights existing under federal copyright law, and should therefore be
preempted.
1. The General Scope or Nature of Copyright Test
The apparent intent of Congress with regard to preemption under
section 301 is one of liberal deference to federal copyright law. 41  "The
'general scope of copyright' means the full scope that Congress could have
described for any particular [federal] right."142  Preemption results
regardless of whether the state right is broader or narrower than the federal
right. 43 Further, any mention of section 106 in the preemption statute "is
by way of identification and not limitation."'" "[E]ven if the precise
contours of the [state] right differ from any of those contained in section
106,"' 14 it is nevertheless subject to preemption.
46
Despite the elimination of provisions from the draft of the bill
explicitly itemizing rights not subject to preemption,' 47 various courts
have held the following state rights not to be affected by the enactment of
section 301: (1) express or implied contracts protecting ideas; s (2)
fraud;149 (3) breach of confidentiality;50  (4) rights to privacy;' (5)
140. See GOLDSTE, supra note 139, § 15.2.1 at 476.
141. See NIM U, supra note 83, § 1.01B][1] at 1-11 n.33 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP.]) ("The preemption is intended to be
complete with respect to any work coming within the scope of the bill... ."). But see id. at 1-12
n.35 (citing HR. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)) (A change in the language of the bill from
"all rights in the nature of copyright' to "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by § 106" indicates that
Congress may have intended to narrow the scope of preemption.).
142. See GOLDsTN, supra note 139, § 15.2.1.1 at 476.
143. See NIMMER. supra note 83, § .01[B][1] at 1-13; see also GOLDSTIN, supra note 139,
§ 15.2.1.1.
144. See NIMMER, supra note 83, § 1.01[B][1] at 1-12.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. § 1.01[B][1] at 1-15 ("[B]efore its amendment into the form which appears in
the Copyright Act, § 301(b)(3) set forth certain examples of rights that are not 'equivalent' to
copyright.').
148. Id. § 1.01[BI~l] at 1-16 to -16.1 n.46.
149. See NIMMER, supra note 83, § 1.01 [B][1] at 1-16.1 n.47.
150. L at 1-16.2 n.48.
151. Id. at 1-18.1 n.49.
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defamation; 2 and (6) the right of publicity. 1 3  Although extensive
debate has ensued regarding the equivalency of the tort of misappropriation
to copyright law,!" federal preemption of adverse possession had not
been addressed by Congress or the courts at that time.
The torts of conversion and trespass were dismissed by Congress as
not being subject to preemption primarily because these causes of action
involve tangible, not intangible property.' The exclusion of these
tangible torts from preemption is an example of the broad nature and scope
of copyright Congress intended for determining whether federal rights are
equivalent to state rights. Following the liberal preemption approach
evident from the legislative history of section 301, since the state adverse
possession of copyright doctrine involves intangible property rights, it is
subject to preemption under the tangible/intangible test applied by Congress
to strike the torts of conversion and trespass from the bill that later became
section 301. The five exclusive rights mentioned in section 106 are: (1)
reproduction, (2) preparation of derivative works, (3) distribution, (4)
performance, and (5) public display.5 6 When a party claims adverse
possession of another's copyright, as was the case in Gee, title to the entire
bundle of rights pertaining to the work thereto are theoretically passed to
the adverse possessor. This assertion of intangible property rights per se
is entirely within the scope of federal copyright protection and must be
preempted according to the "equivalency test" for two reasons.
First, once a party successfully proves adverse possession of another's
copyright, he becomes the rightful owner of the copyright and may assert
any of the exclusive rights mentioned under section 106. Second, in order
to accomplish the above result, the adverse possessor must prove,
essentially, that he infringed the original owner's copyright in a proscribed
way and for a specific period of time. In other words, the.general subject
matter of section 301 is implicated in any adverse possession action, and
preemption is thereby required according to the broad "equivalency test."
2. The 'Extra-Element" Approach
"Courts generally hold that a state right is not equivalent to copyright,
and thus is not subject to preemption, if the state cause of action contains
152. Id.
153. Id. at n.49.1.
154. See NDAMER, supra note 83, § 1.01I1B][1] at 1-19 to -20.7.
155. Id § 1.01[B][1] at 1-20 n.51.
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1977).
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an operative element that is absent from the cause of action for copyright
infringement."'" Applying this formulation of the "extra-element"
approach literally-by comparing adverse possession and a cause of action
for copyright infringement-presents difficulties. Generally, one could
view the doctrine of adverse possession as either a cause of action or an
affirmative defense. This Article takes the position that the doctrine is a
hybrid, depending on the manner in which it is raised according to court
procedure.
Traditionally, if the original landowner brings an action sounding in
trespass to dispose of the adverse possessor, then the doctrine would be
raised as an affirmative defense much akin to a statute of limitations time
bar in any civil action. On the other hand, the adverse possessor, upon
learning the identity of the original owner, may institute suit and invoke the
doctrine of adverse possession as a cause of action. Even if the original
owner cannot be found, an action to quiet title would be treated similarly.
These procedural distinctions have an impact on the application of the
"extra-element" test depending upon how one construes this judicial
approach to federal preemption.
A strict construction of the "extra-element" theory would entail only
a comparison between the elements of adverse possession as a state cause
of action and those of a copyright infringement action. Hence, if the
doctrine of adverse possession is raised as a defense, or is considered to be
a defense in disguise, it is automatically preempted.
A liberal interpretation of the "extra-element" standard would treat the
classification of a state legal theory as an action or defense to be a mere
formality, and would look to the underlying substance of the right. Thus,
the "extra-element" would include those elements contained within both
defenses and causes of action. A liberal construction would be sensible
because regardless of how adverse possession is claimed, whether it be as
an affirmative defense or a cause of action, the adverse possessor would
possess the burden of proof, despite procedural semantics.
Although the copyright portion of the analysis refers specifically to an
infringement action,' any defense or related matter which serves to
preclude the institution of such a federal action should be considered when
comparing federal and state rights. Under such a construction of the "extra-
element" approach, the proof required under adverse possession of
copyright, whether pleaded as an action or an affirmative defense, would
be compared to the proof necessary to prove a prima facie case of federal
157. GoLDsTmn, supra note 139, § 15.2.1.2 at 478.
158. Id.
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copyright infringement as well as any applicable affirmative defenses.
This liberal construction of the "extra-element' standard appears to be
the most viable alternative because it prevents state procedural classification
of adverse possession from circumventing federal preemption. It would not
be reasonable, under a strict construction of the "extra-element" test, to
allow preemption merely because an adverse possessor brought an action
before the original owner could do so. Whether a right is classified as a
defense or an action, the same elements of adverse possession must be
satisfied. Further, all defenses to copyright infringement should be
considered elements under the "extra-element' test since they are often
mutually exclusive and closely related to the elements of a prima facie case
that must be established." 9 The only difference in most instances is that
the defendant has the burden of proof where a right is classified as an
affirmative defense.
Thus, regardless of which construction of the "extra-element" test is
adopted, the state adverse possession of copyright doctrine must be
preempted. In the following sections, the elements of a cause of action for
adverse possession of copyright and a federal infringement action will be
compared to demonstrate that no "extra element' exists.
a. Intent
"The question of adverse possession is one of intention; and the claim
of adverse possession is founded on the intent with which the occupant has
held possession."' 60 The intent of a claimant to acquire title is essential
to establish the elements of "hostile possession under a claim of right' and
"exclusive possession."'
6'
Under the "extra-element" approach, in order "[teo save a state right
from preemption, the extra element must relate to the economic scope of
the right and not to the state of mind of the defendant."' 62 Hence, the
adverse possession elements of "hostility" and "exclusivity" cannot be
considered "extra elements" under any circumstances.
159. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 83, § 13.06 at 13-130 (The defense of "abandonment" of
copyright is the functional equivalent of contesting the element of "ownership" in a cause of
action for copyright infringement.).
160. 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 26 (1972).
161. Id. at 681. 'There can be no adverse possession without an intention to claim title
coincident with the possession; and such intention is essential to make the possession adverse,
hostile, and exclusive." Id. (footnotes omitted).
162. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 139, § 15.2.1.2 at 478-79.
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A rationale for the above "state-of-mind" exception in favor of federal
preemption stems from the nature of an action for copyright infringement.
Copyright infringement certainly does not involve an intentional tort, rather,
it sounds in either strict liability or negligence.
"[Tihere are only two elements necessary to the plaintiff's case in an
infringement action: ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff and
copying by the defendant."163 The only culpable act the plaintiff must
prove is copying by the defendant. Thus, the crux of an infringement
action is the act of copying by a defendant, not his state of mind. Liability
for the mere commission of an act is akin to strict liability.
Also, one may view an infringement action as one of negli-
gence-even though the defendant inadvertently copies the plaintiff's work,
he is under a duty to be aware of its existence, and should check the
copyright office records to prevent a future infringement. The legal reality
that the "innocent intent" of the defendant is not a defense to a copyright
infringement action'" supports the strict liability and/or negligence
classifications. Moreover, the relevance of an adverse possessor's "good
faith" intention to traditional adverse possession doctrine in the real and
personal property context,165 and its irrelevance to copyright infringement,
suggest that copyright and adverse possession are strange bedfellows, with
significant theoretical distinctions.
b. Open and Notorious
"Unless, the true owner has actual knowledge of the hostile claim, it
is essential to the acquisition of title by ... adverse possession that the
possession be open, . . . visible, . . public, and notorious."'" Thus, in
adverse possession of copyright, the adverse possessor must utilize the
original owner's work in such a way as to give the latter notice of
infringement. Where the original owner does not have actual knowledge
of the infringement, the doctrine of "fraudulent concealment"'" is the
device which precludes the open and notorious element from being
163. NIMMER, supra note 83, § 13.01 at 13-4 (footnotes omitted).
164. See id. § 13.08 at 13-137. However, the defense of innocent intent may "bear upon the
remedies available against such a defendant." Id.
165. See GERSTENBELrH, supra note 2, at 119.
166. 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 48 (1972) (citations omitted).
167. "American legislatures have given concrete shape to the maxim that no man should profit
from his own wrong by enacting statutes precluding use of statutes of limitations when they
would allow defendants to hide behind their own fraudulent acts." R.H. HELMHoLz, Wrongful
Possession Of Chattels: Hornbook Law And Case Law, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1221, 1234 (1986).
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considered an "extra element."
"It is a well settled principle of general common law ... as well as of
federal law ... that fraudulent concealment of a cause of action by the
defendant will toll the statute of limitations."' Hence, a defendant in a
copyright infringement case cannot succeed upon a statute of limitations
defense if he fraudulently concealed his use of the work.
Although the element of fraud may be lacking in an adverse possession
of copyright claim, one thing is certain: If the adverse possessor conceals
his use of the work, the open and notorious element cannot be established.
As a result, the element of open and notorious possession is partially
incorporated into the fraudulent concealment doctrine, and thereby fails the
"extra-element" test.
Fraudulent concealment presupposes that the plaintiff did not have
actual knowledge of the adverse use. If there is actual knowledge,
however, preemption would nevertheless result. Upon proof that the
original owner possessed actual knowledge of adverse possession, the open
and notorious element need not be established. Whether or not actual
knowledge then becomes a substituted element of adverse possession, in
lieu of the open and notorious requirement, is a question of semantics. If
actual knowledge is not considered an element, it is subject to preemption
for its failure to meet the "extra-element" test. But, even if one assumes
that actual knowledge does become an element in lieu of the open and
notorious possession requirement, it would not amount to an "extra
element."
Under federal law, a plaintiff may be estopped from claiming
copyright infringement where: (1) the plaintiff knew the facts of the
defendant's infringing conduct, (2) the defendant intended that his conduct
would be acted on, (3) the defendant must be ignorant of the true facts, and
(4) the defendant must rely on the plaintiff's conduct to his injury.1"
The first element of this defense requires that the plaintiff/original owner
have knowledge of the defendant/adverse possessor's use of the copyrighted
work. Therefore, since one of the elements of the federal estoppel defense
is equivalent to the adverse possession element of actual knowledge, the
latter is not an "extra element" and thereby lends support to the preemption
position.
168. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1971).
169. NIMMER, supra note 83, § 13.07 at 13-133 to -134.
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c. Actual Possession
In order to prevail on a traditional adverse possession claim for real
property, "there must be actual possession of some part of the premises,
rather than a mere constructive possession."'7 ° Applying this doctrine to
copyright becomes impossible, because one cannot physically possess
something intangible."' However, assuming one could adversely possess
a copyright, such possession would always be merely symbolic-in the
form of a copyright registration certificate or other document.7 2 Hence,
the element of actual possession would need to be eliminated if applied to
copyright, and therefore, it could not qualify as an "extra element' and
would be subject to preemption.
Notwithstanding the above position, even if a copyright could be
actually possessed, this element would still fall short of becoming an "extra
element." "Generally speaking, actual possession may and must consist of
the exercise of positive, physical acts of dominion or ownership .... 1
Essentially then, any dispute as to the element of actual copyright
possession would be an issue of "ownership"--a primary element in
proving a prima facie case of copyright infringement. 74 Therefore, these
elements of "ownership" and "actual possession" are one in the same,
actual possession does not constitute an "extra element," and it is thereby
subjected to federal preemption.'"
170. 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 30 (1972).
171. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
172. The reference here to actual and constructive possession should not be confused with the
previous discussion of actual and constructive notice. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying
text. The former distinction merely signifies the impossibility for one to ever physically possess
intangible property, except when constructively manifested in a separate and collateral legal
document or instrument. Although this could be a form of possession, it is certainly not "actual
possession" within the meaning of adverse possession theory.
173. 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 33 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
174. See NMMER, supra note 83, § 13.01 at 13-4.
175. Further, within the copyright infringement issue of ownership is the defense of
abandonment. See NMMEP, supra note 83, § 13.06 at 13-130. A plaintiff's intentional and
voluntary abandonment of his copyright prevents the manifestation of his cause of action due to
the inability of establishing the element of ownership.
At first glance, one might equate abandonment with an original copyright owner's failure
to diligently utilize his work within the framework of adverse possession and its policies
(including an original owner sleeping on his rights). See infra part VLB. (discussion of "demerit"
theory). This concept could be classified as "constructive abandonment." However, the
requirement that the copyright owner must intend "to surrender rights in his work," NVM4ER,
supra note 83, § 13.06 at 13-130, differs substantially from the intent of adverse possession.
Where adverse possession is involved, the intent of the original owner is irrelevant. See
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In addition, it is important to recognize the consequence of a prima
facie case of adverse possession of copyright. Under this doctrine, the
ultimate result is a transfer of ownership from the original copyright owner
to the adverse possessor.
One could easily conclude that the doctrine as a whole involves merely
the question of ownership required to prove a prima facie case of copyright
infringement. According to this reasoning, all of the elements of adverse
possession relate to, and are encompassed within, the ownership element
Acceptance of this argument, of course, presumes that there are no "extra
elements," and thus warrants a finding of federal preemption.
d. Continuous Possession and Section 507
"Continuity of adverse possession for the full statutory period without
interruption or breach is generally considered to be an essential prerequisite
to the perfection of title by adverse possession; indeed, continuity is
perhaps the most important concept in this doctrine of limitations." '76
Therefore, the state statute of limitations is indispensable to the element of
"continuity."
Similarly, under federal law, satisfaction of the statute of limitations
is necessary to successfully institute an action for copyright infringement.
Section 507(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that "[n]o civil action
shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced
within three years after the claim accrued."'7 This three year statute
serves the same general purpose as state adverse possession continuity
requirements and, as a result, cannot be an "extra elemenf' escaping
preemption.
Despite the generic nature of the statute of limitations-as it pertains to
the continuity element, it is possible to consider the state continuity
requirement as going one step further than what is necessary under section
507. Not only must the original owner bring an action prior to the statute
running its course, but even if the statute has expired, an interrupted or
discontinued possession by the adverse possessor will invalidate his claim
supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text. Instead, an intent to abandon leaves the copyrighted
work without an owner and thrusts it into the public domain, thus making adverse possession
unnecessary and impossible.
176. 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 149 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
177. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1992).
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to title."'8 Under the federal statute, no such continuity is required other
than that an action be "commenced within three years after the claim ac-
crued."'79 Hence, the state continuous possession requirement might be
considered an "extra element" rendering federal preemption under section
507(b) inoperative. However, other inconsistent state time frames must
conform to the express three year statute."e
The adverse possessor's argument is tenuous in two respects: (1) it
ignores the effect of "claim accrual" upon operation of the state continuity
requirement; and (2) it disregards the federal policies underlying section
507. Before these two problems can be addressed, it is important to
understand the difference between adverse possession of land of chattels
and that of copyright.
Assuming that adverse possession of intangible property is accorded
credence, since there can be no physical possession of this form of
property,"' there must be some type of "use" of this abstract property.
Therefore, the "continuous possession" element must be transformed to
"continuous use." Once this distinction is noted, one can easily foresee the
overlap between the federal and state statutes.
Since each separate act constitutes a separate and actionable infringe-
ment, the result is that section 507(b) prevents an infringer's use from ever
being continuous. Even if an adverse possessor utilizes another's copyright
continuously for three years without the original owner commencing an
infringement action, on the last day before the statute runs a new cause of
action would accrue, thus starting the three year statute running anew.
Therefore, the continuity requirement cannot exist co-extensively with
section 507, and there is, in reality, no "extra element" precluding federal
preemption.
The intent of Congress in enacting the three year federal statute of
limitations for copyright infringement actions was set forth in Prather v.
Neva Paperbacks, Inc.,'B where the court rejected the plaintiff's argument
178. "Generally, under the rule necessitating continuity of adverse possession, continuous
possession is possession which has not been abandoned by the claimant, and uninterrupted
possession is that which has not been effectively interrupted by possession of another. So,
continuous adverse possession is not established by a mere claim of title, disconnected periods
of occupancy, casual or incidental acts of dominion or trespass, or sporadic acts of ownership
widely scattered and not persisted in, even where such incursions cover the whole period of
limitations." 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 150 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
179. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1992).
180. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
182. 446 F.2d 338. 340-41 (5th Cir 1971).
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that the Florida Blameless Ignorance Rule should operate to toll the federal
statute.1
83
Circuit Judge Goldberg, writing for the Prather court, reasoned as
follows:
Prior to 1957 there was no statute of limitations on civil suits
relating to copyright infringement, and courts applied the law of
the state in which the action was brought. This led to a wide
divergence of time periods in which infringement suits could be
brought in the various state& and thus encouraged forum shop-
ping. The Senate report on the bill which became the limitations
statute leaves no doubt but that the purpose of the legislation
incorporating the three year limitations period was to provide a
uniform federal period of limitations applicable throughout the
United States.... In short, the federal statute seeks to nationalize
the copyright statute of limitations, but if each state can fetter,
condition, and entail its effect, we end with a parochial instead of
a national statute!'"
If state statutes of limitations were applied in adverse possession of
copyright cases, the purpose of section 507 would be circumvented.
Claimants would be permitted to engage in forum shopping because there
is no national uniformity with regard to state adverse possession law. Thus,
any state time period other than three years would be inconsistent with the
provisions of section 507, would not be considered an "extra" or different
element, and would thereby be subject to absolute federal preemption.
B. Tangible Medium of Expression
"Section 301 ... expressly withhold[s] federal preemption from works
'not fixed in any tangible medium of expression.' As to such works, the
states may fashion such protection as they wish, including rights which are
'equivalent' to copyright."' s Examples of state rights in unfixed works
that are immune from preemption were set forth in the House Report
183. See id. at 339-40.
184. Id. Here, the court in Prather was discussing the three year statute of limitations
earmarked as 17 U.S.C. § 115(b) (1992). See id. at 339. Although the section number of this
provision was changed to 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1992), the text of this statute has remained
unaltered. See NIRMME, supra note 83, § 12.05 at 12-64.13 n.2. Hence, the same legislative
intent underlying the adoption of § 115(b) as discussed in Prather survives and applies to the
current § 507(b).
185. NDMnmR, supra note 83, § 1.01[B][2][a] at 1-23.
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a prima facie case of adverse possession of a work not fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, under some hypothetical state law, one must show
that the work was utilized only by simultaneously proving that it has now
been transformed into a fixed and tangible medium of expression. Without
further discussion, it is clear that this doctrine would be subject to federal
preemption because the tangible expression would now fall within the ambit
of federal copyright law.
C. Subject Matter of Copyright
The third requirement for federal preemption is that the state law
"come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103." '1 Section 102 partially defines the "subject matter of copy-
right" by listing seven types of "works of authorship:"
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings."8 9
Section 103 merely incorporates "compilations and derivative works" into
the above categories.1
It is evident that any state claim for adverse possession of copyright
will come within the subject matter of copyright and thus meet this
requisite for federal preemption under section 301(a). The categories which
describe various works of authorship in sections 102 and 103 run the gamut
of creativity, and would apply to all works under which an adverse
possession claim could be made. The fact that the state adverse possession
doctrine purports to grant title to federal copyright law rights is enough to
establish that it would always meet the subject matter test.
Even if the adversely possessed work is not a valid copyright because
it fails to comply with the federal laws, this is inconsequential for
preemption purposes. If the work could have qualified for federal
protection, then it is within the subject matter of sections 102 and 103. For
example, if a sound recording fell into the public domain, a state law
188. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1977). 'The subject matter of copyright as specified in § 102
includes compilations and derivative works." Id.
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accompanying the passage of section 301: "[1] Choreography that has
never been filmed or notated, [2] an extemporaneous speech, [3] 'original
works of authorship' communicated solely through conversations or live
broadcasts, and [4] a dramatic sketch or musical composition improvised
or developed from memory and without being recorded or written
down."
186
The adverse possession of copyright doctrine, by definition, would
always satisfy the "tangible medium of expression" requirement, and would
be preempted by federal law under all circumstances. All works subject to
copyright protection under federal law must be fixed in a tangible
expression in order to be classified as such. Therefore, if one claims that
he adversely possessed another's otherwise valid copyright, this allegation
alone admits the tangible fixation of expression; otherwise, there would be
no copyright adversely to possess.
Whether states may apply adverse possession to works or ideas that
would not otherwise qualify for copyright protection or be preempted due
to the absence of a fixed tangible medium of expression, is a separate
question not within the scope of this Article. However, brief mention of
the logical impossibility of such doctrines to exist and survive is warranted.
If it is difficult to envision the adverse possession of intangible rights
with regard to copyright, it becomes absurd to consider possession of
another's idea or unfixed expression. Not only is there no object to be
physically possessed, there is no tangible expression that can be duplicated.
The idea or unfixed expression would remain in the public domain unless
a contract right pertaining thereto is violated.
Furthermore, if an adverse possessor seeks to prove the elements of
adverse possession under Gee, she would be required to show that "use"
was made of the property. In order to do so, there must be a fixed and
tangible medium of expression; absent a contract for an idea, no property
rights exist, and there is no title to adversely possess or use.'
However, assuming the preceding action is valid, in order to make out
186. GOLDSTE, supra note 139, § 15.2.2 at 486.
187. Even if there was a contract for an idea, and the party who paid valuable consideration
for this public domain matter transformed it into a tangible expression or misused the idea in
breach of the contract terms, only a breach of contract action would be available to the aggrieved
party. Otherwise, a proposition that one can adversely possess a contractual right would develop.
Certainly, this concept is ludicrous. Persistent breaches of contract, without the non-breaching
party taking legal recourse, is remedied most equitably through the concept of equitable estoppel
and the statute of limitations for breach of contract. In addition, acquiescence of the non-
breaching party to potential breaching activity can be used to interpret the contract itself, within
the substantive framework of contract law.
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granting protection to this work via adverse possession would nevertheless
be subject to preemption.
The legislative history underlying adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act
supports the broad interpretation that should be afforded to the subject
matter of copyright. The House Report accompanying the Act states:
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter
categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States
from protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory
copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to
qualify, or because it has fallen into the public domain. 9'
The Gee court failed to recognize the significance of this preemptive
scenario, although the rights at issue therein certainly came within the
subject matter of copyright. In Gee, the controversy surrounding Bessie
Smith's recording of "At the Christmas Ball" fits squarely within two of the
works of authorship defining the subject matter of federal copyright law,
namely, (1) a "musical work [with] accompanying words;" 1" and (2) a
"sound recording.'"93  Thus, as illustrated in Gee, the state adverse
possession of copyright doctrine must become one with the subject matter
of copyright under all circumstances.
D. The Supremacy Clause
If the federal copyright preemption statute, 17 U.S.C. § 301, did not
exist, a constitutional attack based on the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution alone would be enough to preempt the state adverse possession
of copyright doctrine. Despite the Congressional codification of the
policies of the Supremacy and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution into
section 301, "[s]evera courts have treated [this section] and the supremacy
clause as discrete sources of preemption."'" Now, the policies and
history surrounding the Supremacy Clause will be analyzed to demonstrate
that an adverse possession of copyright theory would be preempted even in
the absence of section 301.
191. H.R. REP., supra note 141, at 131. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 139, § 15.2.3 at 490;
NImomR, supra note 83, § 1.0111[2] at 1-22.2 n.87.
192. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1977).
193. Id. at § 102(a)(7).
194. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINE:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INrELEJAL PROPERTY 771 (3d ed. 1990); see, e.g.,
Associated Film Distrib. Corp. v. Thomburgh, 614 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affid, 800 F.2d
369 (3d Cir. 1986).
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Alexander Hamilton discussed the scope of the Supremacy Clause as
follows:
[I]t will not follow... that acts of the larger society [the federal
government] which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers,
but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller
societies, [the states] will become the supreme law of the land.
These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be
treated as such. Hence we perceive that the clause which declares
the supremacy of the laws of the Union .... only declares a truth
which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of
a federal government. It will not, I presume, have escaped
observation that it expressly confines this supremacy to laws
made pursuant to the Constitution .... '9s
Apparently, the import of Hamilton's argument is that powers not expressly
and exclusively conferred upon Congress by the Constitution reside in the
states. This inherent state domain is subject neither to the intrusions of the
Supremacy Clause nor to the doctrine of federal preemption.
In the copyright area, it is clear that Congress has the express power
to legislate pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitu-
tion. The issue then becomes whether this express power prevents the
individual states from enacting copyright related laws in the absence of
federal legislation. Under a strict interpretation of the Supremacy Clause,
the issue would be resolved in the affirmative.
Judging from the comments of Alexander Hamilton, the expression of
one power by the federal government leads to the exclusion of other
residual powers of the states,'97 unless the express power specifically
refers to the states. This position can be inferred from Hamilton's
discourse on the inapplicability of the Supremacy Clause to the taxing
power.
In the area of taxation, the Constitution grants concurrent jurisdiction
to the states and the federal government 9 Therefore, the contention in
support of a strict interpretation would focus upon the failure of the framers
to include a concurrent powers provision in the Copyright Clause, while it
did do so in the Taxing and Spending Clause. As a result, under this
195. THE FEDERALIT No. 34, at 204-05 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
196. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
197. The maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is obviously implicated here. "When
certain persons or things are specified in a law ... an intention to exclude all others from its
operation may be inferred." BLACK's LAW DICFIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
198. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 195, at 205.
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construction, the adverse possession of copyright doctrine would be
preempted regardless of whether any federal laws were enacted pursuant to
the Copyright Clause.
Even under a liberal interpretation of the Copyright Clause, the plain
language and meaning of its provision would preclude application of the
state adverse possession doctrine. An expansive application of the
Copyright Clause would allow the states to create law regarding matters not
within the scope of federal legislation. The courts have adopted this view
to a certain extent, thereby allowing state protection for ideas, facts and
various other items.199
Even in the absence of section 301 and any federal copyright law, the
Supremacy Clause limits the states from imposing or preventing any type
of monopoly available to authors for their "respective writings and
discoveries,"' because this power is expressly reserved to Congress by
virtue of the Copyright Clause. This position is consistent with the validity
of state common law copyright protection because ideas are not "writings."
Therefore, under a pure constitutional approach, the state doctrine of
adverse possession could never permissibly be applied where "writings" or
expression are concerned, and the Gee decision would be constitutionally
invalid even if no federal copyright law existed.
VI. THE POLICIES UNDERLYING ADVERSE PoSSESSION AND
FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW
The two primary policies advanced by the doctrine of adverse
possession concern statutes of limitations and the utilization of property.
These rationales acquire acceptance and strength where real and personal
property are involved. However, attempting to promote these basic
premises by extending the doctrine to copyright, clashes with both the
policies that form the backbone of copyright law and those mandated by the
Constitution.
At this point, the importance of the conflicting policies described
above will be addressed. This Article contends that the policies of
copyright should prevail and that the doctrine of adverse possession should
never apply to copyright law. The crucial role that policy arguments play
in our society cannot be understated. They cut at the very existence of
each and every law and function as a skeleton that supports the rules that
199. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
200. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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The function of adverse possession is akin to that of a statute of
limitations,201 namely to avoid stale claims and to encourage "the settle-
ment and repose of titles." Hence, policies of stability and evasion of
evidentiary problems-encountered where a lazy property owner attempts
to regain access to his property-are promoted by this doctrine. Basically,
inclusion of the "continuous possession" requirement in a prima facie case
for adverse possession is the equivalent of a statute of limitations against
the original owner of the property-its expiration bars his legal rights to
reclaim the property.
Section 507 of the 1976 Copyright Act fulfills the purpose of avoiding
stale claims. The three year statute of limitations for copyright infringe-
ment actions precludes the maintenance of a suit where the quality of
evidence is likely to be deficient. The availability of witnesses, their fading
memories, the likelihood that certain physical evidence may not have a
sufficient foundation for admissibility, and the interests of judicial economy
are all contributing factors justifying the presence of a statute of limitations.
Congress has expressly balanced the rights of a copyright owner in
enforcing the constitutionally-limited monopoly and the interests of the
public in preventing the annoyance and complications created by stale
claims. Therefore, as discussed earlier, the three year federal statute of
limitations preempts any state adverse possession cause of action for
copyright.
2°3
Aside from the preemption position, there is a paramount distinction
which must be drawn between operation of the federal statute of limitations
and the doctrine of adverse possession. A successful application of the
adverse possession doctrine results in acquisition of actual title to the
property in question.2' If the doctrine is applied to copyright law, it not
only bars the original owner's right to sue for infringement, but it also vests
title in the adverse possessor. Therefore, adverse possession involves more
than a mere statute of limitations bar on litigation; it grants an exclusive
federal right to a specific person or entity. This consequence differs from
the operation of section 507.
Since section 507 bars a plaintiff from commencing an infringement
suit over three years after the cause of action accrued, there would be no
201. See 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 1 (1972). See, e.g., Reiter v. Landon Homes, Inc.,
287 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y. Sup. C. 1968), aff'd, 295 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
202. 2 C.S. Adverse Possession § 2 (1972). See, e.g., O'Hara v. Wallace, 371 N.Y.S.2d 570
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), modified on other grounds, 382 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
203. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
204. See 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 2 (1972).
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federal right to a specific person or entity. This consequence differs from
the operation of section 507.
Since section 507 bars a plaintiff from commencing an infrngement
suit over three years after the cause of action accrued, there would be no
subsequent transfer of title to the defendant. In addition, copyright law
would not allow the defendant to use the copyrighted materials after
dismissal of such an action. If the defendant did commence activities
evincing purported ownership (similar to infringement) after dismissal on
statute of limitations grounds, a new cause of action for copyright
infringement would accrue, and the plaintiff would be able to again bring
suit to enforce his copyright. 2
The policies underlying the limitation of actions are currently served
within the copyright realm by existing law, namely section 507. Not only
would the application of adverse possession to copyright be superfluous
with regard to these policies, but it also transfers title to the adverse
possessor. This ripening of inchoate title into actual title contravenes the
very essence and purpose of copyright law, which grants a limited
monopoly subject only to federal and constitutional limitations.'
B. The Economically Viable Utilization of Property
Versus the Copyright Clause
The unique rationale for adverse possession as a doctrine of property
law centers around societal preference for the maximum use of land and
chattels. "[Tihe specific goals of the adverse possession doctrine [are] to
encourage commercial certainty and the resulting economic productivity in
the utilization of various forms of property."2' Thus, the basic supposi-
tion is that society will ultimately benefit where property is optimized to its
utmost capacity.
It is relatively easy to visualize this policy in action. For instance,
where a tract of land is involved, the neighboring community would derive
more utility from maintenance by a diligent owner, rather than an
abandoned and useless plot. Of course, the nature of the use will differ
depending upon the quality and characteristics of the tract itself and
surrounding plots. For example, some land may be better suited for
commercial high rise buildings or business districts; others may be better
205. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
207. GERSTBiLr, supra note 2, at 120.
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suited for parks, open terrain, residential dwellings or some other use.
Assuming this extension of the doctrine is valid, the same rationale would
apply to the adverse possession of personal property. Depending upon the
characteristics of the chattel, rewarding its use by an adverse possessor
might, in the long run, benefit society to a greater extent than if the original
owner allowed the object to remain dormant and nonexistent for practical
purposes.
There are two approaches one could adopt in exploring utilization
policy: (1) a "merit" theory, and (2) a "demerit" theory. A view founded
on merit awards the adverse possessor for making use of the land or
chattels in question. A demerit approach would punish the original
property owner for sleeping on her rights and allowing an adverse possessor
to utilize the land or chattel without exercising a timely right of entry or
institution of an action in the nature of replevin or conversion. Both views
are a fair explanation for the policy underpinnings of the adverse possession
doctrine. However, when the doctrine is applied to copyright, these policies
conflict with the purposes of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
The Copyright Clause confers a legislative prerogative upon Congress
"[tio promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."2t s This provision safeguards the
author and benefits the public.' Thus, economic, not moral reward for
the author, is the established purpose of copyright.2 10
The economic construction of the Copyright Clause was set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein:
211
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Con-
gress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted
to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the
services rendered.1 2
According to Mazer, the amount of time expended by the author in creating
208. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
209. See NMMERt, supra note 83, § 1.03[A] at 1-31 to -32. "Thus the authorization to grant
to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright is predicated upon the dual premises that
the public benefits from the creative activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a
necessary condition to the full realization of such creative activities." Id. at 1-32.
210. See id.
211. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
212. Id. at 219.
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a copyrightable work is rewarded by granting a limited monopoly as to the
economic benefits which accrue during that period. The rationale of Mazer
is that the potential benefit of economic award will give rise to an incentive
for authors to create distinct and multiple works. This judicial construction,
as well as the meaning of additional language within the Copyright Clause,
underlies the concept and policies underlying the doctrine of adverse
possession.
As explored earlier, the adverse possession of copyright doctrine goes
far beyond being merely an affirmative defense akin to the statute of
limitations. Instead, title is transferred; and in the context of copyright, all
the exclusive rights of a copyright holder under section 106 are granted to
the adverse possessor. However, the mere utilization of a copyright by any
other person or entity than the original creator or owner destroys the
incentive provided by the very existence of copyright law protection and
the interpretation currently afforded the Copyright Clause.
Under the "merit" approach, the policy of rewarding the adverse
possessor for economic, productive use of another's copyright is a direct
affront to the purpose of copyright law. By transferring title to a non-
author for the mere economic use of another's copyright, the law would
create a countervailing incentive encouraging the maximum utilization of
existing works, rather than promoting the creation of unique and multifari-
ous works envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. Even under a
"demerit approach rationale" for adverse possession, the policies of
copyright would be fundamentally impaired and circumvented. Punishing
a copyright holder for her failure to utilize and economically exhaust the
work in the marketplace contradicts the nature of the rights provided under
federal law.
The mirror image of the rights granted under section 106 is the right
not to introduce a work to the public. In the publishing, music and
entertainment business, timing is especially crucial to success. If a
copyright owner deems it is in her best interest to halt the release of a book
or record because of market strategy aimed at enhancing her financial
return, or even to protect the author's reputation, it is her prerogative to do
SO.
The right to withhold one's work is consistent with the grant of a
limited monopoly." 3 What is important for the purposes of Mazer is not
213. One may analogize this concept.with the right of first publication granted under federal
copyright law. "Ideas are free. But while the author confines them to his study, they are like
birds in a cage, which none but he can have a right to let fly: for, till he thinks proper to
emancipate them, they are under his own dominion." M. FRANcEs McNAMARA, 2,000 FAMOUS
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that the economic incentive actually encourages the author to make a
copyrightable work, but that it is there if the author desires to be inspired
by it. The potential a copyright's economic incentive will encourage the
creativity of authors is the purpose behind that Copyright Clause. The
purpose does not depend upon the creation of actual economic incentive.
The theory according to Mazer is that, in our society, monetary reward
is currently the best way, but not the only way, to encourage progress of
the arts. Regardless of whether the incentive is economic or for other
reasons, the creation of new and original works is the goal. However, this
goal is impeded by the adverse possession of copyright doctrine, because
the confiscation and use of the works of others would be promoted. As a
result, authors would lose the incentive to create, and, overall, our society
would ultimately be devoid of or lacking in creativity.
A proponent of adverse possession might argue that the pecuniary
underpinnings of the Copyright Clause and this ancient property doctrine
are consistent. The Copyright Clause utilizes economics to confer an
incentive upon authors to create works, and adverse possession rewards the
party which maximizes the economic utility of the copyright if the original
owner or author sleeps on her rights. Therefore, the premise of such a
contention would center around the ultimate benefit society derives from
the presence or availability of a work on the market.
Of course, the adverse possessor who places another's work on the
market uses her own capital and expects to receive financial return from the
sale and exploitation of this copyright. Pursuant to Mazer, the adverse
possession advocate would couch her argument in terms of "advanc[ing]
[the] public welfare." 2 4 Thus, the goal of copyright is to advance the
public welfare, and this end would be achieved by awarding limited
monopoly privileges to the person or entity that best markets the product.
According to adverse possession proponents, effectuating the availability of
a work to the general public for its enjoyment far outweighs the right of an
author to conceal her work.
1. Authors
A supporter of the adverse possession of copyright doctrine would find
it inevitable and inescapable that the economic incentive of the copyright
clause is intended to benefit creators only, not those who merely utilize the
LEGAL QUOTATIONS 124 (1967) (citing Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2378 (1769) (Yates, J.)).
214. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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another, the broad and expansive interpretation that the courts have
undertaken1 could not reasonably be extended to grant rights to an
infringer.
Authorship currently tends to be defined in terms of originality.216
"However, originality itself must exhibit a modicum of intellectual labor in
order to constitute the product of an author."217  Those favorable to
adverse possession would claim that one's effort in utilizing or marketing
another's work would be enough intellectual labor to establish authorship
within the meaning of the broad constitutional interpretation afforded this
term.
Although a "very minimal degree" of intellectual labor is adequate to
qualify an individual as an author,28 a position encouraging acts of
infringement to establish authorship is tenuous. The entire aim of copyright
is to prevent one from copying another's original product. By using
another's work, nothing is added to its quality. The very notion of
copyright would be vitiated if such an overbroad and expansive definition
of "author" is adopted. As a result, every infringer under the Copyright
Act could potentially qualify as an "author".
2. Derivative Works
A more complex question is presented where one utilizes another's
work, but then builds upon or adds something of originality to it that would
otherwise constitute a derivative work, absent infringement. Section 101
of the 1976 Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as follows:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexist-
ing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatiza-
tion, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a "derivative work."2 9
This detailed definition would encompass many different situations. For
example, if the defendant in Gee took Bessie Smith's recording of "At the
215. See N1MMER, supra note 83, § 1.06[A] at 1-37 n.2.
216. See id. at 1-37.
217. 1d. (emphasis omitted).
218. See id.
219. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977).
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authorship, is a "derivative work.""2 9
This detailed definition would encompass many different situations. For
example, if the defendant in Gee took Bessie Smith's recording of "At the
Christmas Ball" and made material alterations in its structure by remixing
the master tape and adding a synthesized keyboard track and background
singers, it would qualify as a derivative sound recording under the above
definition.
Nevertheless, original modifications to another's copyrighted work
constitutes infringement. One of the exclusive rights conferred on a
copyright owner under section 106 is the authority "to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work." Therefore, the argument that
adverse possession should be allowed with regard to derivative
works-because the adverse possessor is an author in the sense that
modifications made to the original work are original in nature-is expressly
disposed of by this federal statute. Any original modification or addition
to the underlying copyrighted work constitutes copyright infringement.
Moreover, even if section 106 did not exist, the mandate of the
Copyright Clause, as construed by the courts, would probably not permit
an adverse possessor's derivative work to be considered a "writing" within
the meaning of this constitutional provision. Although the terms "writings"
has been liberally interpreted overall, there are essentially two minimum
standards which a work must meet in order to qualify: (1) it must contain
"a modicum of intellectual labor;" and (2) "it must be embodied in some
tangible form." '
According to the aforementioned constitutional requirements, an
adversely possessed derivative work might be considered a "writing"
because it certainly must be in some tangible form to be adversely-
possessed. Hence, a slight contribution of intellectual labor would probably
be involved in any derivative type of work. However, the next step in the
analysis concerns whether the rights of a copyright owner (who has either
expended a great amount of intellectual labor in the work or who has paid
adequate consideration for title to same) should be impaired by minor
alterations or additions made by an adverse possessor.
To allow minor creative modifications to qualify a work as a "writing"
under judicial construction of the Copyright Clause would frustrate the
express and manifest purpose of this provision to "promote the Progress of
219. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977).
220. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1977).
221. NIMMER, supra note 83, §§ 1.08[C][1]-1.08[C][2] at 1-47 to -49.
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Science and useful Arts."' The incentive for authors to create new
works would be dissipated, and instead, individuals would find it easier and
more advantageous to alter preexisting works and adversely possess the
original in the process. Therefore, where adverse possession is accom-
plished through the creation of a stealthily derivative work, the plain
meaning and overriding policy of the Copyright Clause dictates that this
expressly intended constitutional purpose, to promote the progress of
Science and useful Arts, be given precedence over any subsequent
inconsistent judicial constructions of the Copyright Clause.
3. Limited Monopoly and Property Rights
Adverse possession advocates must also realize that, by contending the
general public's benefit from effective utilization of a copyright outweighs
the author's rights, they arrive at the direct conflict this traditional property
law doctrine has with the "for limited times!' language of the Copyright
Clause. The constitutional mandate is that the monopoly and title to the
author's copyrighted work be "for limited times." According to the
late Professor Melville Nimmer, "[tihis phrase creates a very real limitation
upon Congressional power. A federal copyright statute which purported to
grant copyright protection in perpetuity would clearly be unconstitution-
a.' Hence, the doctrine of adverse possession which confers fee
simple absolute title to real property would be unconstitutional if applied
to copyright law.
The indefinite nature of the enjoyment of personal property, and of
real property subject only to the rigors of the rule against perpetuities, has
no place in copyright law due to the "for limited times" provision in Article
I of the Constitution. Even if Congress desired to include the doctrine of
adverse possession in the Copyright Act, it could not. The effect of doing
so could impede the work's entry into the public domain for a prolonged
222. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cI. 8.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. NIMMER, supra note 83, § 1.05[A][I] at 1-36.2. 'the 'limited times' provision does not
limit the perpetual protection available to works under the state law doctrine of common law
copyright, provided such state law has not been the subject of federal preemption. However,
perpetual protection for such works may be invalid by reason of First Amendment limitations."
Id. § 1.05[C] at 1-36.6 (footnotes omitted). Hence, for free speech purposes, the doctrine of
adverse possession, if applied to ideas and facts, is likely to be invalid because the indefinite title
which would vest could unduly restrict society's constitutional right of access to useful
information.
1992]
92 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
period of time, thus frustrating the underlying purpose of the limited
monopoly language. For example, if a person adversely possessed a
copyright before the end of the original author's life plus fifty years, the
copyright belongs to the adverse possessor for her lifetime plus another
fifty years, assuming that the end of the original author's monopoly does
not thrust the work into the public domain.226 In this case, the work
could be denied to a vast array of potential authors who wish to capitalize
upon and create new works using portions of the original work.
4. Droit Moral
In response to the position that adverse possession and copyright law
are both based on the theory of public benefit derived from the economic
utilization of works, one must remember that the law does not only protect
those interests intended by the drafters. The law may also serve other
unforeseen or unrecognized purposes. Even though the Copyright Clause
and its judicial construction in Mazer suggest that economic incentive is the
primary purpose of copyright, there are other factors which motivate an
author to create works, such as moral rights, fame, prestige and other
amorphous non-monetary rewards which may accrue to a successful author
or composer.
The concept of "droit moral" is defined as a "[n]on-pecuniary right
based upon the dual relationship between society and its artists, and the
artist and his work."227 Although moral rights are not explicitly recog-
nized in American copyright law, they can be seen as inextricably
226. However, a differing interpretation derived from the traditional rules of adverse
possession might grant title to the adverse possessor only for the remainder of the original
copyright owner's monopoly. For example, analogous to the real property realm: if A adversely
possesses B's Blackacre (B possessing a life estate, remainder to C), while B is in possession, A
would only be entitled to B's life estate. If applied to copyright law, the life estate would be
equivalent to the federal statutory monopoly period (lifetime plus forty-nine years), and the public
could be the remaindermen because under the Copyright Act, after the monopoly period, the work
is available to the public for copying (public domain). Hence, under this approach, the adverse
possessor would only be entitled to use for life plus forty-nine years.
227. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 497 (6th ed. 1990).
228. Circuit Judge Frank's discourse on the essence of an artist's moral rights to her work
reveals yet another justification for the refusal of American Courts to recognize its validity:
(a) '?Moral right" seems to indicate to some persons something not legal, something
meta-legal. (b) The "moral right" doctrine, as applied in some countries, includes
very extensive rights which courts in some American jurisdictions are not yet
prepared to acknowledge; as a result, the phrase "moral right" seems to have
frightened some of those courts to such an extent that they have unduly narrowed
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intertwined with the economic rights that are afforded protection.
Often, fame and self-realization accrue to an author where her work
has become economically successful. The effect created by public benefit
from a particular work upon the ego and attitude of its author cannot be
overlooked. To theoretically separate economic from moral incentive, and
to allow the law to protect only the former, is unrealistic. Therefore, even
though the concept of "droit moral' is a predominantly European pre-
cept 9 not explicitly accepted by American legal theory, it still is found
in the structure of copyright law due to droit moral's effect upon an
author's creative incentive.
Assuming arguendo that an artist's moral rights are not tacitly
protected by American copyright law, they should be safeguarded and
recognized. While one cannot ignore the significance of the economic
incentive referred to in Mazer, neither the language of Mazer nor the
Copyright Clause expressly limit other incentives.23°
Any law that is rationally related to furthering the general goal of the
Copyright Clause, namely the provision of a limited monopoly to provide
a creative incentive to authors, should be upheld. 1 Hence, Congress has
broad discretion to decide what means it should employ to achieve this
goal. The economic considerations addressed in Mazer are merely one of
the ways of sparking the fire of creativity. There is room for including
moral rights within the protectable sphere of copyright law because they
promote the general purpose of the Copyright Clause.
After accepting the proposal that "droit morar' should be an explicitly
recognized precept in American copyright law, destruction of the adverse
artists' rights.
Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J•, concurring) (footnotes omitted).
However, as Judge Frank's comments illustrate, this judicial reluctance and apprehension to accept
the concept of "droit moral" and the importance attributed to the legal protection of economic
rights is to be expected from a capitalist oriented nation such as the United States, where, in the
minds of government officials, the almighty dollar is the only incentive that could inspire an
author to create.
229. See id at 590.
230. "Mhe phrase 'To promote the progress of science and useful arts...' must be read
... in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not in limitation of its
exercise." NIMMER. supra note 83, § 1.03[A] at 1-34 (footnotes omitted).
231. The rational relationship standard would apply as long as the extent of the remedy (i.e.,
monetary damages for damage to an author's reputation as a result of copyright infringement)
creates the incentive. However, where the extent of protection is enlarged (i.e., to label as
infringement an entirely original work which mentions another artist's name in the lyrics and
damages their reputation), the First Amendment would be implicated and the constitutional strict
scrutiny standard might apply.
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possession of copyright argument based on economic incentive is inevitable.
While adverse possession supporters may quarrel with the premise of moral
rights as a legitimate end, it is indisputable that the ultimate goal of the
Copyright Clause is certainly not to allow one to accrue capital from
another's stagnant copyrighted work if not in the public domain. The only
support the adverse possession of copyright theory could acquire on policy
grounds would be that both this doctrine and the Copyright Clause protect
economic interests. However, if moral rights either inhere within the
structure of these economic interests, or are accepted within the realm of
copyright, this would weaken the force of the adverse possession argument.
The type of moral satisfaction, if any, that an adverse possessor would
achieve by utilizing another's original work is clearly not contemplated by
the traditional concept of droit moral. The special relationship created
between an artist and society is not likely to manifest itself in an adverse
possession context because it would be difficult for the public to acclaim
one who did not create the work. Where art and music are involved, the
natural human tendency is to recognize one for his or her artistic labor and
skills.
It may be a different situation where a segment of society respects an
adverse copyright possessor for his marketing and business skills in the
utilization of that copyright. But, praise for keen business acumen has no
place in the concept of droit moral or copyright, because it does not
promote the creation of new works, only increased infringement. Further,
an adverse possessor cannot claim droit moral, because he did not create
the work. However, it could be argued that the adverse possessor forms a
strong attachment to the copyright as a result of the intense use, marketing
and sale of the work.
This type of moral, or possibly immoral, relationship between an
adverse possessor and another's work is not within the scope of droit
moral. The recognition of moral right entails the encouragement of
incentive through close affiliation with and respect for the artist's labor and
skill, which is reflected in the work product. Of course, the adverse
possessor lacks this artistic self-worth.
Many jurists that adhere to the natural law origins of property
ownership and rights would support the notion of droit moral and would
probably reject the adverse possession of copyright doctrine as inconsistent
with that fundamental precept. The logic of the natural law argument is
that
the origin of property [is found in] preoccupancy . ... Pre-
occupancy is first possession; and this is given by creation, by
production. The creator is the first possessor of that which he
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creates. In labor, then, is found the origin of the right to
property. Occupancy implies labor .... It matters not whether
the labor be of the body or of the mind ....
Intellectual labor... [although] [i]ncorporeal itself,... is
generally attached to the corporeal. 2s 2
This theory is a hybrid formulation of the first occupancy concept which
surfaces in the writings of Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and Sir William
Blackstone (which examine legal theory back to Roman Law), and the
labor-reward philosophy of John Locke. 233
Modem property law philosophy is based primarily upon David
Hume's and Jeremy Bentham's theory of utilitarianism.' The applica-
tion of a balancing test ultimately favoring a law which "promotes happi-
ness"273 to benefit society is the essence of utilitarianism.236  This view
that "property denotes a bundle of rights, a set of relations among people
with respect to things" 7 could permit the restriction of one's property
rights if increased happiness to society would result.
Utilitarianism provides the foundation through which modem American
copyright law may promote only economic interests, because, presumably,
more individuals in this particular society would benefit from the monetary
approach than from protecting the moral rights of authors." Yet, to the
extent that economic and moral incentives do not conflict, society would
ultimately reap the benefit and enjoyment of abundant works if a dual
moral/economic incentive were to inspire the authors and composers of
today. Moreover, the principles of natural justice that form the basis for
droit moral, as previously described, were incorporated into the first
copyright statute-England's Statute of Anne.239  After the American
232. EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECrUAL
PRODUCTIoNs IN GREAT BRITAN AND TmE UNrrED STATES 2-6 (1972). "The principle is as old
as property itself, that what a man (or woman] creates by his [or her] own labor, out of his [or
her] own materials, is his [or hers] to enjoy to the exclusion of all others. It is based not only
on natural right, but also on the necessities of society, being essential to the promotion of
industry." Id. at 4.
233. See Dutn c mNR supra note 29, at 132-36.
234. See id. at 137-38.
235. See id. at 137.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 138.
238. See supra note 229.
239. See PATRY, supra note 109, at 2-4. "Our law relating to literary and artistic property
is essentially an inheritance from England. It seems that from the time 'whereof the memory of
man runneth not to the contrary,' the author's right to his or her manuscript was recognized on
principles of natural justice, being the product of intellectual labor and as much the author's own
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Revolution, "all of the colonies except Delaware passed laws to afford
protection to authors."m These laws were based primarily upon the
Statute of Anne.241 Although these state statutes were later superseded
by national legislation resulting from adoption of the Copyright Clause,24
it is reasonable to speculate that the framers may have intended to emulate
the English system in this regard, including the concept of droit moral or
natural rights recognized in Britain.
One may counter this position by referring to the intense disdain for
Britain that existed in the Colonies prior to and following the Revolutionary
War. However, the disfavored monarchical structure of England does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that every aspect of English law was evil.
Hence, in light of the absence of debate and discussion surrounding the
adoption of the Copyright Clause, this possibility remains open.
The courts should reconsider the policies underlying American
copyright law so that droit moral can find its place within its structure. If
this is accomplished, one could never rationally consider the doctrine of
adverse possession as applying to copyrighted works. Doing so would
defeat the entire purpose of moral rights arising from the creation of a
work; rights which an adverse possessor does not possess. "[Wihere the
science of law has attained its highest state, there is no purer, stronger,
better title to property than that acquired by production. To him [or her]
belongs the harvest whose toil has produced it; to him [or her], the fruit
who has planted the tree."
243
5. The Essence of Constitutional Authority
An additional reason why the state doctrine of adverse possession has
absolutely no place within copyright law is the nature of the authority from
which such rights originate. First, adverse possession is enacted pursuant
to the state police power designed to protect the general health, welfare and
morals of its citizens.2' Although some scholars may argue that the
police power is a logical implication to draw from the Tenth Amendment
property as the substance on which it was written." Id. at 2.
240. Id. at 5.
241. See id. at 4.
242. See id.
243. DRONE, supra note 230, at 4.
244. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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of the Constitution,25 there is otherwise no express constitutional provi-
sion designating the existence of this power. Of course, the Federalist
Papers indicate that the inherent residual powers of each sovereign state
were a natural and accepted implication of the institution of a federal
government.
Second, Congress' authority to enact federal copyright law is expressly
provided for in the Constitution.'"7 The mere fact that the framers
deemed it necessary to specifically refer to the copyright power, and not to
mention the police power in this much cherished and vital document, is an
indication of the priority that should be afforded each respective right.
Reconciling the doctrine of adverse possession with copyright
necessarily involves a clash between the police power and the Copyright
Clause. Since copyright involves an express constitutional mandate and
adverse possession does not, the policies underlying the former, to the
extent that they conflict with the policies of the latter, should prevail.
Copyright protection encourages the very existence and proliferation
of artistic works, and is a higher constitutional value in all respects. Hence,
the inferior and tenuous adverse possession policies found within the sphere
of a power not expressly defined anywhere in the Constitution, should be
disregarded in its entirety and severed from any aspect of copyright law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The adverse possession of copyright doctrine is blemished from several
viewpoints. Not only does existing federal copyright law require its
rejection, but it is theoretically and practically defective. Although this
traditional real property doctrine was tenuously extended to personal
property, the adverse possession of an intangible copyright is preposterous.
The Gee decision is an unworkable aberration. Its continuing
precedential value undercuts copyright concepts and could turn an ordinary
lawsuit into a legal and factual quagmire. Not only does Gee's unfounded
extension of the adverse possession doctrine vitiate the purposes and
policies of copyright law, but the reasoning employed to arrive at its
holding is fallacious and confused.
245. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
246. See 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law § 432 at 390 ("'Mhe term [police power] is... used
to denote those inherent governmental powers which, under the federal system established by the
Constitution of the United States, are reserved to the several states.").
247. See supra note 130.
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Gee is corrupt precedent and should be promptly overruled, if a court
of appropriate jurisdiction has the opportunity to do so. As long as this
decision remains intact, defendants in copyright infringement actions will
continue to possess a trump card, enabling them to harass courts with the
complex issues discussed in this Article.
If a court is again presented with a cause of action or defense pleaded
as adverse possession of copyright, it should not hesitate to reject it outright
and dismiss the claim. If the Gee quandary cannot be remedied by
common law action through the judicial system, Congress should take the
initiative immediately. Adverse possession of copyright is currently invalid
due to the existence of a federal preemption statute,M and under every
permissible construction and application of this enactment. 249 Neverthe-
less, it is within Congressional authority under the Copyright and Suprema-
cy Clauses to explicitly declare this diseased doctrine unconstitutional and
set the record straight. In sum, the purported adverse possession of
copyright doctrine is a pseudo-intellectual nuisance that must be abated and
destroyed.
248. See 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1977).
249. See supra notes 129-200 and accompanying text.
